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How to improve the federal/state "partnership" in the
environmental area is a difficult subject. Despite my best
attempts to devise simple solutions ..., the situation is not
amenable to easy fixes.'
Controversy concerning the appropriate division of responsibility
and power between the federal government and the states has a long
history in the United States, extending back at least to the eighteenth
century.' This historical dispute encompasses the debate over the
1. E. Donald Elliott, Keynote Presentation: Making the Partnership Work, 22 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,010, 10,010 (Jan. 1992) (given by Professor Elliott, then
General Counsel for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
2. ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES
& THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 8 (1992) (stating that "[t]he argument about which
functions should be exercised by the federal government and which by the states has
been going on for more than two hundred years"). Rivlin expresses her view that
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century.2  This historical dispute encompasses the debate over the
appropriate locus of authority for environmental regulation.3
2. ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES
& THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 8 (1992) (stating that "[tihe argument about which
functions should be exercised by the federal government and which by the states has
been going on for more than two hundred years"). Rivlin expresses her view that
"(t]here are no 'right' answers. The prevailing view shifts with changing perceptions
of the needs of the country and the relative competence and responsiveness of the states
and the federal government." Id
3. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY
AIR 5-6 (198 1) (discussing the concept of "cooperative federalism" under which "states,
operating under loose federal supervision, are asked to design a program responsive to
the peculiarities of local conditions"); Adam Babich, Coming to Grips With Toxic
Waste: The Need for Cooperative Federalism in the Superfund Program, 19 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,009 (Jan. 1989) (arguing that EPA should provide oversight
and funding for the federal Superfund program, while state and local governments
implement the program); Martin H. Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's:
Shifting Back the Burden of Proof, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1984) (summarizing the
evolution of the federal/state relationship in environmental regulation); James R. Elder
et al., Regulation of Water Quality: Is EPA Meeting Its Obligations or Can the States
Better Meet Water Quality Challenges? Recent Controversies over Toxics that
Originally Were Not Regulated Lead to Questions About EPA's Ability to Regulate
Effectively, 22 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl L. Inst.) 10,029 (Jan. 1992) (authors express
differing opinions as to whether states are better able to regulate water quality than the
federal government); Nancy Firestone et al., Regulating Solid and Hazardous Wastes:
Has Federal Regulation Lived Up to Its Mandate or Can the States Do a Better Job?,
22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst) 10,038 (Jan. 1992) (authors express differing opinions
as to whether states are better able to regulate solid and hazardous waste than the
federal government); Hubert H. Humphrey 1II & Leroy C. Paddock, The Federal and
State Roles in Environmental Enforcement: A Proposal for a More Effective and More
Efficient Relationship, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 7 (1990) (providing a history of the
allocation of responsibility for environmental enforcement between the federal and state
governments, and urging that states occupy a position of primacy once they have
established their capability to handle such responsibilities); Dixie L. Laswell, State-
Federal Relations Under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
16 NAT. RESOURCES L. 641 (1984) (arguing that EPA has unduly restricted states from
administering their own hazardous waste programs); David M. Levy, Comment,
Federalism and the Environment: National Solid Waste Management v. Alabama Dep't
of Envtl. Management, 12 WHTrIER L. REV. 635 (1991) (suggesting that the current
trend in regulation is for Congress to encourage states to take an active role in
environmental protection); Julie J. Thompson, Comment, Municipal Solid Waste
Management: The States Must Pick Up Where Congress Left Off, 23 AKRON L. REV.
587 (1990) (arguing that the federal government has done little to address solid waste
management and that states should take the lead); James P. Young, Comment,
Expanding State Initiation and Enforcement Under Superfund, 57 U. Cmi. L. REV. 985
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP UNDER SUPERFUND
This Article discusses the appropriate role for states under the
federal environmental law that governs the remediation of toxic waste
sites, formally known as the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund"). 4 The
Article identifies the major problem areas in the federal/state partnership
under this existing law and discusses possible solutions.
Section I of the Article provides an overview of the history of the
federal Superfund program as well as a summary of the program's
performance during its thirteen-year history. Section II contains findings
and recommendations concerning how best to improve the federal/state
relationship under CERCLA by making changes within the existing
framework for federal/state relations. Section III describes three
alternative models for radically restructuring the federal/state relationship
under CERCLA rather than refining the existing structure.
The author's research into the role that states actually play, and
ideally should play, in the federal Superfund program was substantially
aided by more than thirty detailed interviews, which the author
conducted, with representatives of all of the major "stakeholders" in the
federal Superfund program. Interviewees included representatives of the
following organizations: United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") Headquarters, EPA regional offices, United States Congress,
United States Department of Justice, state regulatory agencies, state
(1990) (arguing that EPA's role in Superfund should be limited to oversight and that
the states should be given control over implementation of remedial actions).
4. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Congress
originally enacted CERCLA in December 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675). The original Act authorized
over $1 billion to pay for site cleanups. CERCLA § I I (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988
& Supp. III). In October 1986, Congress reauthorized CERCLA for another five years
in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), and increased the
size of the trust fund to $8.5 billion. Id. (SARA appears at Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675)). In an amendment
to the 1990 budget, Congress extended the 1991 expiration date for another four years
through September 1994, and provided an additional $5.1 billion in funding. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-
319 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)). The term "Superfund,"
originally termed the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund, derives from the trust
fund originally created under CERCLA in 1980. Lawrence E. Starfield, The 1990
National Contingency Plan - More Detail and More Structure, But Still a Balancing
Act, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222, 10,225 n.1 (June 1990).
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attorneys general, citizen groups and responsible parties.5
5. Each interview typically lasted from one to three hours. In addition to the more
than 30 individuals whom the author interviewed, officials from Clean Sites, Inc.,
conducted a number of interviews as well, using questionnaires developed by the
author. All of these interviews were conducted on a "not for attribution" basis in order
to promote the candid expression of views.
One goal was to select interviewees who would represent a good cross-section
of the states. Interviewees included officials from six of the ten states with more than
100 people working on cleanup activities (California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio and Washington); officials from one of the three states with between 51 and
100 people (Minnesota); and officials from two of the 28 states with between 11 and
50 people (Virginia and New Hampshire). No one from a state with fewer than 10
people was interviewed. For additional information on the size of various state
Superfund programs, see OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 9375.6-08B, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE
SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, at 15 & Figure 111-2 (1991)
[hereinafter 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE]. This update is the most recent of three
editions of the 50-State Study. For two earlier versions, see OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA/540/8-
91/002, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY (1989)
[hereinafter 50-STATE STUDY, 1989]; and OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL
RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB No. EPA/540/8-89/001, AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1990 UPDATE (1990)
[hereinafter 50-STATE STUDY, 1990 UPDATE].
From the federal government, interviewees included officials from several
different groups within EPA Headquarters, as well as officials from EPA Regions 1,
2, 3, 5 and 10. Interviewees from both EPA Headquarters and EPA regions were also
included because EPA Headquarters' officials and regional officials often have
dramatically different perspectives on particular issues. Regional officials also differ
among themselves. THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, CLEANING UP
THE MESS: IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND 9 (1993).
Further, the author attempted to get both sides of the story by interviewing
federal and state officials who interact professionally with each other. For example, the
author interviewed both EPA Region I officials, who cover the New England states, and
state officials from two of these states, Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
Finally, the author interviewed representatives from the potentially responsible
party ("PRP") community and from environmental groups. The terms "responsible
parties" or "PRPs" are shorthand references for parties liable under the CERCLA § 107
liability scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991). See infra notes 32-34
and accompanying text. Within this group, the author interviewed industry officials,
but did not talk with representatives of specific sub-groups such as municipal officials
or federal facility representatives.
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP UNDER SUPERFUND
I. BACKGROUND ON THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM
A. A Condensed History of Superfund from its Inception in 1980 to
the Current Debate on Reauthorization of the Superfund Law
1. Environmental Catastrophes
The seeds for the federal Superfund program were sown in places
such as Love Canal, located in Niagara Falls, New York. A 1978 report
from the New York State Office of Public Health, entitled Love Canal:
Public Health Time Bomb,' captures the mood that prevailed in the late
1970s and led to the December 1980 passage of the federal Superfund
law:
Love Canal is a name which until recently was
relegated to the back pages of history along with the
unspent dreams of a visionary for whom it is named.
Today, more than three-quarters of a century later,
this 16-acre rectangular piece of land, located only a few
miles from the world-famous waterfall which each year
attracts thousands to ... Niagara Falls, has again become
the focus of international attention ....
Described as an environmental time bomb gone off,
Love Canal stands as testimony to the ignorance, [and the]
lack of vision and proper laws of decades past which
allowed the indiscriminate disposal of ... toxic materials.
The consequences of these transgressions are
mirrored by the planned exodus of 235 families and the
public monies and herculean efforts which now must be
expended to contain the disaster and restore a degree of
normalcy to the lives of those affected.
For those responsible for containing the problem
and for government leaders in New York State and
throughout the nation, Love Canal represents what may
6. LovE CANAL: PUBLIC HEALTH TIME BOMB, A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
AND LEGISLATURE (Sept. 1978) (prepared by the New York State Office of Public
Health and the Governor's Love Canal Inter-Agency Task Force) [hereinafter LOVE
CANAL REPORT].
1993]
8 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIROMENTAL LAW [Vol. 18:01
very well be the first of a new and sinister breed of
environmental disasters.7
The name "Love Canal" became synonymous with toxic waste
disposal through events that took almost a century to culminate.8 In
May 1892, William T. Love arrived in Niagara Falls with a "long-held
dream: to build a carefully planned industrial city with convenient access
to inexpensive water power and major markets."9 At the heart of Love's
dream was the creation of a canal that would provide power from the
nearby upper and lower Niagara Rivers to this industrial complex.' °
The canal would convey water to the Niagara Terrace, enabling Love to
create an immense quantity of water power through the 300-foot drop in
the water level at the Terrace. " The plan seemed to be a good idea
because at the time, water power was the cheapest form of power, and
it was essential that power users be located near the source because it
was almost impossible to transmit electricity over any great distance. '
Love, "a man of considerable energy and charisma," succeeded in
galvanizing public support for his vision, including gaining legislative
authority to condemn properties and to divert as much water from the
upper Niagara River as he deemed necessary, "even to the extent of
turning off Niagara Falls!"' 3 He obtained financial backing as well, and
7. Id at 3.
8. Id at 2-3.
9. Id. at 2.
10. i.
!1. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Mr. Love "extensively promoted his model city through ads, circulars and even
brass bands playing his 'original' ditty." Id. The first three verses of the "ditty,"
entitled "The Model City," illustrate the optimism surrounding Love's vision:
THE MODEL CITY
(Tune of Yankee Doodle)
Every body's [sic] come to town,
Those left we all do pity,
For we'll have a jolly time
At Love's new Model City.
(Chorus)
If you get there before I do
Tell 'em I'm a comin' too
To see the things so wondrous true
At Love's new Model City.
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONS-IP UNDER SUPERFUND
in October 1893, the first factory on his townsite opened.'4 In May
1894, work to build the canal began."
Love's realization of his vision was interrupted by a "full-scale
economic depression," which caused his financial backing to begin to slip
away. 6 The "coup-de-grace" was delivered by the discovery of a way
to transmit power economically over long distances. This technological
advance dealt Love's project a "death blow."'17
Love's personal reversals resulted in the foreclosure of his
property and its sale at a public auction in 1910.8 The "sole surviving
monument" to Love's vision was a partially dug section of canal in the
southeast corner of the City of Niagara Falls."9 The Love Canal report
indicates that in the early portion of the twentieth century this part of the
canal served as a swimming hole.2" The report indicates that,
the excavation was turned to a new and ominous use [in
the 1920s]. It [the canal] became a chemical and
municipal disposal site for several chemical companies
and the City of Niagara Falls. Chemicals of unknown
kind and quantity were buried at the site for a 25-30 year
period, up until 1953. After 1953, the site was covered
with earth.2'
The report also notes that during the late 1950s, the community built an
elementary- school and approximately one hundred single-family homes
directly adjacent to the Love Canal landfill.'
(Chorus)
They'r [sic] building now a great big ditch
Through dirt and rock so gritty
They say 'twill make all very rich
Who live in Model City[.]
Id
14. Id at 3.
15. Id
16. Id.
17. Id
18. id
19. Id.
20. Id
21. Id
22. Id
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The Love Canal report continues by describing the discovery and
response to contamination:
[T]he Love Canal problem began to surface in recent
years as chemical odors in the basements of the homes
bordering the site became more noticeable. This followed
prolonged heavy rains and one of the worst blizzards ever
to hit this section of the country.
Thus began a series of events and momentous
decisions involving city, county, State and Federal
governments to cope with what can only be described as
a major human and environmental tragedy without
precedent and unparalleled in New York State's history.
2 3
New York State dealt with this tragedy by taking the following
actions. 4 State of New York Health Commissioner Whalen termed the
Love Canal "'an extremely serious threat to the health and welfare"' and
ordered immediate remedial measures to remove visible chemicals,
restrict access to the site and initiate health and engineering studies.2
State officials also discovered that "unacceptable levels of toxic vapors
associated with more than 80 compounds were emanating from the
basements of many homes in the first ring directly adjacent to the Love
Canal."16 Based on "preliminary epidemiologic investigations" showing
a concentration of miscarriages in certain residential areas near Love
Canal, the Office of Public Health recommended "immediate relocation
of all pregnant women and all children under two years of age from the
23. Id. New York State Health Commissioner Robert P. Whalen, M.D., in his
November 2, 1978, order, described the situation:
[S]aid site constitutes a public nuisance and an extremely serious
threat and danger to the health, safety and welfare of those using it,
living near it, or exposed to the conditions emanating from it,
consisting, among other things, of chemical wastes lying exposed on
the surface in numerous places and pervasive, pernicious and
obnoxious chemical vapors and fumes affecting both the ambient air
and the homes of certain residents living near such site ....
Id at 27.
24. See id "at 23-25 (setting forth a chronology of events).
25. Id at 6.
26. Id.
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP UNDER SUPERFUND
Love Canal area." '27 Finally, by August 10, 1978, the state decided "to
offer to relocate and purchase the homes of all 235 families [living] in
the first two rings [around Love Canal]."2
2. The Federal Government's Response
In early 1980, public outrage over scenes of environmental
degradation like Love Canal -- chemicals seeping out of the ground into
basements, abandoned drums of hazardous waste leaking into farmers'
fields and similar threats to our sense of well-being and security --
resounded throughout the country. In December 1980, Congress reacted
to this outrage by passing the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act,29 better known as Superfund.3°
Congress designed CERCLA to deal with the legacy of the less appealing
side of our industrial society over the past century -- the disposal of
hazardous materials in ways that jeopardize the health of our citizens and
the quality of our environment.3
27. Id. at 12-15.
28. Id at 18.
29. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988 & Supp. I 1991)).
30. See Richard C. Belthoff, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of
CERCLA, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 143 (1986) (discussing.the origin of CERCLA
as a reaction to hazardous waste disasters such as Love Canal, the Times Beach
incident, and Valley of the Drums, and noting that "Love Canal may have benn [sic]
the major consciousness-raising episode that led to the enactment of CERCLA");
Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of
Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 263-65 (1985) (discussing CERCLA's background as
a statute intended to tackle the clean up of past hazardous waste disposal sites,
including Love Canal); Sharon L. McCarthy, Note, CERCLA Cleanup Costs under
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: Property Damage or Economic
Damage?, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 1169, 1169-74 (1988) (discussing the origin of
CERCLA and naming environmental disasters such as Times Beach, Love Canal, and
the Valley of the Drums as events that led to the enactment of CERCLA); WILLIAM K.
REILLY, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE
SUPERFIUND PROGRAM i (June 1989) (Superfund was "[s]peedily launched in response
to such dramatic episodes as the Love Canal .....") [hereinafter 90-DAY STUDY]. The
90-Day Study was a 90-day review of the Superfund program conducted by EPA
Administrator Wlliam Reilly.
31. See Anderson, supra note 30, at 264-65. For a portion of the legislative history
of CERCLA, see Hazardous Waste Disposal: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
1993] •
12 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 18:01
When Congress enacted CERCLA, it established a statutory
scheme that it hoped would give the government a very strong hand in
deciding "who pays" for cleaning up Love Canal and similar sites.
32
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Hazardous Waste Disposal: Our Number One
Environmental Problem: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Transportation and
Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1980); see also Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 1 (1982).
Congress enacted CERCLA to fill a gap left by the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"). Pub. L. No. 94-580 (1976) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). RCRA is known as a "cradle-to-grave"
statute because it covers the management of hazardous waste from its creation to
disposal, but not beyond disposal. Elizabeth Cheng, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker:
Assessing Civil Penalties Against Federal Facilities Under RCRA, 57 U. CtI. L. REv.
845, 846 (1990) ("RCRA, passed in 1976, established a 'cradle-to-grave' scheme of
measures -- including permits, monitoring, and recordkeeping -- for regulating the
generation, transport, treatment, and disposal of solid waste"). RCRA does contain a
remedial component but provides only limited authority to clean up hazardous waste
sites, that is, RCRA does not contain a federal remedial fund. RCRA §§ 3008, 7003,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6973 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
32. See McCarthy, supra note 30, at 1172. Because much of the disposal of hazardous
substances that created Superfund sites was not illegal at the time it occurred, many
commentators have criticized CERCLA for its unfairness in holding liable the
companies responsible for such disposal. See, e.g., Insurance Industry Officials
Recommend Ending Superfund Retroactive Liability, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Nov.
18, 1991; Superfund Steeped in Litigation Costs, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE, June
1992; Superfund Law Should Be Shorn of Retroactivity, Study Says, LIABILITY WEEK,
Jan. 19, 1993.
The courts, however, characterize Congress' policy as a judgment of whether
the public or such companies should pay to clean up these vestiges of our past. Even
if the companies' conduct was in complete compliance with the law in effect at the
time of disposal, Congress decided that the companies, and not the public, should bear
the burden; the courts have upheld this policy judgment. See, e.g., Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 748 F. Supp. 283, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("Although CERCLA does
not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is clear from the statutory language that
Congress intended for CERCLA to have retroactive effect"); see also United States v.
Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072, 1077-79 (D. Colo. 1985) (outlining the
legislative history of CERCLA and its original Senate bill, S. 1480, and concluding that
Congress intended CERCLA to be applied retroactively, and that such retroactive
application does not violate due process); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987) (following Shell Oil and finding that CERCLA was intended to be applied
retroactively, and this retroactive application of CERCLA does not violate due process);
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP UNDER SUPERFUND
CERCLA makes four classes of persons strictly liable for Superfund
sites: (1) the present owner or operator of such sites; (2) persons who
owned or operated such sites at the time of disposal of hazardous
substances; (3) persons who arranged for the disposal, treatment or
transport of hazardous substances at the sites; and (4) persons who accept
or accepted hazardous substances for transport to such sites." Over the
past thirteen years, courts almost uniformly have sided with the
United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 556-57 (W.D.N.Y.
1988) (holding that CERCLA was enacted as a means to impose retroactive liability,
and this retroactive liability does not violate the Due Process Clause, the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the Article I Contract Clause).
33. CERCLA § 107(a)(l)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
These parties are liable for the following costs:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id. § 107(a)(4)(A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D). Only very limited defenses are
available to parties that fall within this liability net. In particular, CERCLA provides
four narrow defenses:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing
directly or indirectly, with the defendant ..., if the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned .... and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of any such third party and the
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or
omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id § 107(bX1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(l)-(4).
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government on questions involving the nature and scope of liability
under CERCLA.34
In addition to "Who pays?," the second major question addressed
by CERCLA is "How clean is clean?" This issue focuses on the level
to which contaminated sites must be cleaned up and the type of cleanup
that is appropriate.3" Because the average federal Superfund site now
34. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 195 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (construing liberally EPA's injunctive authority under CERCLA § 106 and
holding that the government does not have to show the actual existence of an
"imminent and substantial endangerment" to establish jurisdiction for injunctive relief
under § 106. Instead, the government must show only that "the circumstances of a
release or threatened release of hazardous substances are such that the environment or
members of the public may become exposed to such substances and are therefore put
at risk"); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991) (extending CERCLA's past owner or operator liability
to secured creditors who participated in financial management of a facility to a degree
evidencing a capacity to influence the debtor's handling of hazardous waste); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Rubin, J.) (construing
CERCLA, which was silent on the nature of liability, to impose joint and several
liability on responsible parties). See also Elizabeth A. Di Cola, Fairness and
Efficiency: Allowing Contribution Under ERISA, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1543, 1581 n.249
(1992) ("[T]he House Committee on Energy and Commerce 'fully subscribes to the
reasoning of the court in the seminal case of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation,
which establishes a uniform federal rule allowing for joint and several liability in
appropriate CERCLA cases."') (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 253 (1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
74 (1985)). Fleet Factors represents "[t]he apogee of CERCLA's power," with the
Eleventh Circuit's decision "highlight[ing] the extraordinary scope of a liability net that
seemed to be expanding without bounds ...." Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard,
The Taming of the EPA, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 1993, at 3.
In The Taming of the EPA, however, Kass and Gerrard suggest that the
pendulum has begun to swing the other way, stating that while "[u]ntil two or three
years ago, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency seemed nearly invincible in its
enforcement of CERCLA .... [tihe judicial winds blowing over the Superfind law have
shifted." Id. at 3. Nevertheless, these commentators concede that "EPA retains
significant authority and leverage under CERCLA," and conclude their article by saying
that they are not suggesting that "defendants seeking to defeat liability still do not have
a steep uphill climb. But at least they now face a steep climb rather than a sheer rock
wall with no handholds." Id. at 4.
35. When Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 by passing SARA, Congress addressed
"How clean is clean?" in much more detail. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). In the
1986 Amendments, Congress created CERCLA § 121, 42 U.S.C. § 9621, to address
cleanup standards. EPA summarizes SARA's impact on the degree of clean up in the
Preamble to the 1990 regulations implementing CERCLA, known as the National
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costs $29 million to clean up, with estimates of the total cleanup bill
ranging from $80 billion to $1 trillion, and because of claims that the
actual threats from these sites do not warrant spending amounts of this
magnitude given the other problems our society confronts, this issue has
received a great deal of attention in recent years.36
The controversy surrounding these two issues, "Who pays?" and
"How clean is clean?," means that CERCLA begins the formal road to
reauthorization in the 103d Congress labeled "'without a doubt' the most
contentious and complicated issue facing the Senate Environment &
Contingency Plan ("NCP"):
Among the major new provisions added by SARA are CERCLA
sections 121(a) through 121(d), which ... stipulat[e] general rules for
the selection of remedial actions, ... describing requirements for the
degree of cleanup. These new sections codify rigorous remedial
action cleanup standards by mandating that on-site remedial actions
meet applicable or relevant and appropriate federal standards and
more stringent state standards.
55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8667 (1990).
For an in depth discussion of EPA's treatment of the issue of "How clean-is
clean?," see Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,230-36.
36. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF PROGRESS IN
CORRECTING SELECTED HIGH-RISK AREAS, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Feb. 3, 1993)
[hereinafter STATUS OF PROGRESS]. With the 1200 plus sites that are on the federal
Superfund list, the total remediation bill will be in the tens of billions of dollars. The
actual number of sites requiring cleanup is expected to dwarf the 1200 plus sites
currently on EPA's list. Id.; see infra note 67 and accompanying text. The ultimate
cleanup bill, therefore, is likely to escalate dramatically as well. Estimates concerning
the total cleanup cost vary widely. One estimate is that the cost of cleaning up
hazardous waste sites will total at least $110 billion. ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD
BRIFFAULT, CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE: IS THERE A BETTER WAY? iii (1993).
Two other studies project clean up costs approaching $1 trillion. See Lynne A.
Reinders, Note, Municipal Liability Under Superfund as Generators of Municipal Solid
Waste: Addressing the Plight of Local Governments, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 419, 423 n.19 (1993) (citing Study Finds Potential Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs May Top $1.5-Trillion, INSIDE EPA, Jan. 3, 1992, at 13 (citing a study
done by the University of Tennessee)); Frank Viviano, Superfund Wallowing in
Financial Mire, MILWAUKEE. J., June 16, 1991, at J1, J3 (citing an estimate given by
Salomon Brothers, a brokerage firm, and Hirschhorn and Associates, an environmental
consulting firm).
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Public Works Committee." 37  To paraphrase a recent headline,
Congress, the administration and a multitude of interest groups are
"bracing" for what promises to be a "rewrite battle" over the future shape
of Superfund.3" Groups from every point on the political spectrum are
mobilizing in an effort to leave their imprint."
37. Superfund Called Second Priority for Senate Environment Committee, SUPERFUND
REP. Apr. 21, 1993 at 5 (SUPERFUND REP. is an environmental newsletter that covers
Superfund matters). See also House, Senate to Hold Superfund Hearings This Week,
SUPERFUND REP. May 5, 1993 at 8.
38. ENV'T TODAY, April 1993, at 1. Superfund already has been the subject of an
enormous amount of commentary, much of it negative. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. NO. OTA-ITE-433, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND'S
PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED ..., at iii (October 1989) [hereinafter COMING CLEAN]
(foreword by John Gibbons, Director of the Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA"),
U.S. Congress) ("From its beginning, controversy has surrounded Superfund, and the
program has had to cope with an unusually high level of public scrutiny, criticism, and
debate"). See, e.g., William N. Hedeman, et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A
Critical Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,413 (July 1991); ALFRED R. LIGHT, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
ILLUMINATING IRRATIONALITY: SELF-DECEPTION AND SUPERFUND LITIGATION (1992);
NATIONAL PAINT AND COATINGS ASS'N, A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND SOME
IDEAS FOR IMPROVEMENT OFFERED BY THE NATIONAL PAINT AND COATINGS ASS'N,
INC., IMPROVING THE SUPERFUND: CORRECTING A NATIONAL POLICY DISASTER
(1992); KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 36; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SUPERFUND: EPA COST ESTIMATES ARE NOT RELIABLE OR TIMELY, REPORT TO THE
ADMINISTRATOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (July 1992); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REP. NO. GAO/RCED-92-138, SUPERFUND: PROBLEMS
WITH THE COMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY OF SITE CLEANUP PLANS, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. on SUPERFND, OCEAN AND WATER PROTECTION, COMM. ON
ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, U.S. SENATE (May 1992) [hereinafter PROBLEMS WITH SITE
CLEANUP PLANS].
39. See Agency Grapples With Issues as Reauthorization Hearings Set to Begin,
SUPERFUND REP., Apr. 7, 1993, at 7 (quoting an EPA official as saying that "it's hard
to find a group not exploring Superfund.") EPA itself has formed a "broad-based
committee" as a subcommittee of the National Advisory Council on Environmental
Policy & Technology ("NACEPT") to serve as an advisory committee to the EPA
Administrator on Superfund. New 'Superfund Evaluation Committee' Launches Series
of Meetings, SUPERFUND REP., June 16, 1993, at 6. A short list of the various groups
developing positions on Superfund includes the following organizations: the Superfund
Improvement Project/ (created by the American Insurance Association); the Coalition
on Superfund (a group of companies from four industry segments: natural resources
and chemicals, insurance, manufacturing, and environmental sciences); the Hazardous
Waste Cleanup Project (a coalition of eight major industry trade associations); the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce; the National Association of Manufacturers Superfund Task
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A third significant issue for the reauthorization debate involves
the respective roles the state and federal governments should play in the
federal Superfund program.4" Indeed, "[tihe issue of [the] states' role
in Superfund is emerging as one of the most prominent the agency and
Congress will address during reauthorization."'" Despite its importance,
Force; the National Commission on Superfund (jointly sponsored by the Keystone
Center and the Vermont Law School's Environmental Law Center); the National
Association of Attorneys General; and the Association of State and Territorial Reform.
Recently, several environmental groups have urged that EPA should try administrative
fixes to Superfund rather than changing the statute itself. Environmentalists Urge
Lawmakers to Hold Off on Changes to Statute, SUPERFUND REP., Apr. 21, 1993, at 5.
At this point in time, Congress does not appear to be accepting this strategy. For
articles referencing the involvement of these and other organizations in the Superfund
reauthorization debate, see generally State Attorneys to Develop Reauthorization
Position, ENVTL. POL'Y ALERT, Apr. 14, 1992, at 9; SUPERFUND REP., Mar. 10, 1993,
at 6; EPA Seeks Administrative Fixes for Superfund Before Reauthorization,
SUPERFUND REP., May 5, 1993, at 4; Key Senator Says Congress Should Move Ahead
With Reauthorization, SUPERFUND REP., May 5, 1993, at 5; Env't Rep. (BNA) 10 (May
7, 1993); National Commission on Superfund Meets With EPA, Hill Staffers,
SUPERFUND REP., June 16, 1993, at 8; fndusty Coalition Unveils Superfund Stance,
Attacking Risk Assessment, ENVTL. POL'Y ALERT, July 7, 1993, at 4.
40. In addition to giving states a role in the federal Superfimd program, CERCLA also
gives political subdivisions and federally recognized Indian tribes opportunities to
participate in the program. See generally CERCLA §§ 101, 104, 107, 126 U.S.C. §§
9601; 9604, 9607, 96261(1988); OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, STATUS OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE
SUPERFUND PROGRAM, FY 80 TO FY 89, at 1 (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter STATE
INVOLVEMENT] (focusing on issues relating to state involvement).
41. EPA Administrator Says States Must Play a 'Strong Role' in Superfund,
SUPERFUND REP., Apr. 7, 1993, at 4. Bruce Diamond, Director of EPA's Office of
Waste Programs Enforcement, is quoted as saying that the issue of the states' role in
Superfund is "probably the most difficult issue to be confronted during reauthorization,
because it is interwoven with all other aspects of the program." Id Thomas Grumbly,
then President of Clean Sites, Inc., and recently confirmed as Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management at the U.S. Department of Energy,
described the issue of the states' role in Superfund as "in many ways the threshold
issue. [It] will set the stage for which way we go with Superfimd." Id at 5-7. EPA
Administrator Browner has personally emphasized the importance of EPA's improving
its partnership with state and local governments, stating that "it is these relationships
that will make or break national environmental efforts." Env't Rep. (BNA) 3118 (May
9, 1993); Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Statement
Before the Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, US. Sen., at I (Mar. 31, 1993) (on file
with author); see also Waste Identification -- Talks Progress Slowly as Disagreements
Persist, ENVTL. POL'Y ALERT, Mar. 31, 1993, at 13 ("[Tlhe role of states and the
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the issue, which is the focus of the Article, has received relatively little
attention to date.42
question of 'how clean is clean' are among the most prominent issues facing EPA as
it gears up for reauthorization. ... Allocation of costs is the third 'key issue"'). EPA's
90-Day Study recognized the importance of this issue to Superfund's success as well,
listing as one of its 50 recommendations for improving Superfund, the need to
"[r]esolve the fundamental policy question of what States' long-term role in the
Superfund program will be, [and to] develop short- and long-term strategies to enhance
State program capability." 90-DAY STUDY, supra note 30, at v.
42. The following is a partial list of articles discussing state Superfund progress and
the federal/state relationship concerning Superfund matters: Donald A. Brown, EPA's
Resolution of the Conflict Between Cleanup Costs and the Law in Setting Cleanup
Standards Under Superfund, 15 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 241 (1990); David L. Markell &
Dolores A. Tuohy, Some Thoughts on Running a Superfund Enforcement Program: A
State Perspective, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Nov. 1990, at 3; James P. Young,
Comment, Expanding State Initiation and Enforcement Under Superfund, 57 U. Cii.
L. REV. 985 (1990) (arguing that the states, not the federal government, should control
hazardous waste cleanups); Jeremy M. Firestone & Robert P. Reichel, The Role of
States in the CERCLA Process After United States v. Azko Coatings of America, Inc.,
NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., June 1992, at 3; Eric Nelson & Ann Hurley, The Slow
but Steady Evolution of State Enforcement under Superfund, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY: HAZARDOUS WASTES, SUPERFUND, AND Toxic SUBSTANCES 33-59 (1992); see
also David L. Markell, Assistant Professor, Albany Law School, Statement Before the
Subcomm. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, US. House of Representatives (Oct. 28, 1993) (on file with author).
Different groups within government, including EPA itself, the Office of
Technology Assessment and the General Accounting Office, have evaluated this issue
as well. See, e.g., 50-STATE STUDY, 1989, supra note 5; 50-STATE STUDY, 1990
UPDATE, supra note 5; 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note 5; STATE
INVOLVEMENT, supra note 40; COMING CLEAN, supra note 38: U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REP. No. GAO/RCED-89-164, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES:
STATE CLEANUP STATUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON ENV'T, ENERGY, AND NATURAL RESOURCES, COMM. ON
GOV'T OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter STATE
CLEANUP STATUS]; PROBLEMS WITH SITE CLEANUP PLANS, supra note 38; see also The
Role of EPA and the States In Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups: Hearing before the
Env't, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Government Operations
Hearing]. A brief article in one of the environmental newsletters, State Role in
Superfund Remedies, Enforcement, More Debated, PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEM. NEWS
(Mar. 31, 1993) (labelling a March 24, 1993, meeting on the role of states in Superfund
as "the first of its kind").-
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B. The Federal Superfund Program: The Interviewees' Perspectives
on the Program's Performance
The prevailing view appears to be that the federal Superfund
program has spent a great deal of money and accomplished very little.43
President Clinton, in his February 18, 1993, address to a joint session of
Congress captured this sentiment when he singled out the Superfund
program for special criticism. "I'd like to use that Superfund to clean up
pollution for a change and not just pay lawyers."" Similarly, the
interviewees raised several concerns about Superfund and some of the
policy choices it reflects.45 Most of the interviewees' concerns focused
on the issue of "How clean is clean?" More narrowly, this issue
concerns whether, from a risk/benefit perspective, a need exists to clean
up sites to the levels that CERCLA currently seems to contemplate;
whether this country can afford such cleanups; and whether, even if the
policy judgment mandates such cleanups, the technology is available to
meet these goals.46
43. See supra note 38 (setting forth representative literature). For a cynical viewpoint
as to why many articles have been critical, see WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL
THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 42-54 (1992). Greider
suggests that once American industrial and financial interests lost the battles during the
1986 legislative debate on Superfund reauthorization, they engaged in "deep lobbying."
Id at 43. These interests financed research in an effort to "convince the uninformed
that the law was not working," believing that "'tihe nature of changes [in Superfund
the next time it is considered for reauthorization) will depend on the emotional climate
at the time of reauthorization and public perception of problems with the existing law."'
Id
44. Clinton's conomic Plan: The Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1993, at A20, A21.
45. While a large number of groups have aggressively criticized various aspects of the
Superfind program, see supra note 38, the author is unaware of any other non-EPA
sponsored efforts to sample the views of the program's implementers (i.e., government
officials) on the issue.
46. Many interviewees identified the issue of "How clean is clean?" as probably the
most significant issue confronting Congress in the reauthorization process. The
interviewees also noted that the "How clean is clean?" issue encompasses two sub-
issues: (1) to what concentration of hazardous substances must contaminated media be
remediated, and (2) what type of remediation is appropriate for these hazardous
substances.
Similarly, EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner has called the question of
"How clean is clean?" the "most vexing of all." Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency, Statement Before the Subcomm. on Superfund, Recycling and
Solid Waste Management of the Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, US. Sen., at 18
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(May 12, 1993) (on file with author). EPA Deputy Administrator Robert Sussman also
recently said that the issue is "obviously at the heart of the debate" over Superfund.
EPA Lays Out Tight Schedule for Administrative Reforms to Superfund, ENVTL. POL'Y
ALERT, July 7, 1993, at 3.
As might be expected, one industry interviewee talked most forcefully on the
issue of risk, stating: "In terms of the threat posed by sites, there is an absolute
misconception. Very few pose a threat." He continued, on the topic of remedy
selection: "The notion that you can clean sites is false. Most of the time you'll need
to contain them." See also Keith Schneider, New View Calls Environmental Policy
Misguided, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1993, at Al, A30. Schneider criticizes the
"overaggressive endeavors" of the EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites that pose little
threat at a cost of millions, or perhaps billions, of dollars in order to come into
compliance with strict federal standards. Id In reference to one commercial dump in
Louisiana, Schneider asserts: "E.P.A. officials said they wanted to make the site safe
enough to be used for any purpose, including houses -- though no one was proposing
to build anything there. With that as the goal, the agency wanted to make sure children
could play in the dirt, even eat it, without risk." Id.
OTA has noted that Superfund "was not created on the basis of lengthy,
detailed studies which made the case for its need", but instead "was born out of
something close to public hysteria ... ." COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 22. The
authors of the OTA report asked whether the sites "pose a problem that justifies a
multibillion dollar program?" and concluded that "[t]he evidence available now
indicates to OTA the answer is yes." Id.
A citizen interviewee who, like OTA, disagreed with the industry interviewee
on the issue of threat, nevertheless found some common ground on the issue of the
achievability of CERCLA's cleanup goals with current technologies. The citizen
interviewee discussed the limitations of current remedial technologies, stating that "for
Superfund to thrive, a big improvement in remedial technologies is needed." Recent
testimony from high-ranking EPA officials reflects that EPA recognizes the need for
continued improvement, as evidenced by EPA's establishment of the Superfund
Innovative Technology Evaluation ("SITE") Program in 1986. EPA designed the SITE
program to encourage the development of innovative cleanup technologies. OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S.ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB.
No. 9200.5-01B, THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM: TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS (1991)
[hereinafter TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS]. Walter Kovalick, Director of the Technology
Innovation Office of the EPA, has noted that several impediments act as barriers to
expanded use of innovative technologies: (1) the absence of "credible" cost and
performance data; (2) the absence of access to the data that does exist; (3) the lack of
a sufficient number of development and training opportunities for innovative
technologies; (4) the barrier created by present permitting regulations, which do not
promote innovation; and (5) the "[flears of failure and 'paying twice' if a technology
fails ... ." Walter W. Kovalick, Jr., Director, Technology Innovation Office, U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, Statement Before the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., at
3 (Sept. 15, 1992) (on file with author). In Coming Clean, OTA makes several
criticisms of the SITE program, including the criticism that "[c]onsiderable progress
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Despite these and other concerns, the overall viewpoint of many
of the interviewees is that the Superfund program has produced
significant successes in recent years. Virtually every federal official, and
several of the other interviewees as well, articulated a different vision of
Superfind's current reality than that which appears to be the accepted
truth today. Many of the interviewees believe that Superfund currently
is working in the sense that hundreds of sites are being cleaned up, and
the sites are being cleaned up by responsible parties."
The federal interviewees readily acknowledged the difficulties that
EPA experienced during the early Superfund years. They talked about
the harmful impact those difficulties have had on the program's
credibility.48 These officials said, however, that over the last three or
toward using more treatment technology has been made, but all too often it is not
used." COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 143.
Despite this criticism and these barriers, EPA officials believe they have made
considerable progress on this front. In his testimony, Mr. Kovalick testifies that "[a]
total of 210 innovative treatment technology approaches have been selected in Records
of Decision (RODs) at Superfund sites between 1982 and the end of Fiscal Year 1991."
Kovalick, supra note 46, at 3. Administrator Browner states that Superfund has
"spurred technological advances," and that "[t]hrough FY 1991, 42 percent of the
technologies selected for use at Superfund sites were developed since the inception of
Superflmd." Browner, supra note 46, at 5-6. For a sweeping criticism of EPA's
current approach to site cleanups under Superfund, see generally PROBLEMS WITH SITE
CLEANUP PLANS, supra note 38.
47. Interviewees questioned the merits of some of the basic current policies of
Superfund, for example, the appropriateness of the current approach to cleanup
standards, and the efficiency of the Superfund process, including the issue of
transaction costs. At the same time, these interviewees stated that despite these issues,
the program is achieving considerable success. Cf E. Donald Elliott, Superfund: EPA
Success, National Debacle?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVr., Winter 1992, at 11 ("[B]y and
large EPA is now faithfully executing congressional mandates .... [T]he Superfund
program is finally working the way Congress intended -- and therein lies the problem").
While detailed analysis of substantive aspects of the Superfund program is beyond the
scope of this article, concerning the relative importance of these various issues, at least
one industry group, the Hazardous Waste Cleanup Project (a coalition of eight major
industry trade associations), appears to have focused its efforts to amend CERCLA on
remedy selection, not on CERCLA's liability scheme, "on the theory that holding down
... costs ... would defuse the battle over who should pay for them ... ." EPA Lays Out
Tight Schedule for Administrative Reforms to Superfund, ENvTL. POL'Y ALERT, July
7, 1993, at 4.
48. In Ten Years of Progress, EPA provides its perspective on its activities during the
early years:
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four years, things have changed. Cleanups are going forward and being
completed49 and the percentage of sites being cleaned up by potentially
responsible parties ("PRPs") has increased dramatically.5 0 They also
EPA spent most of the first decade of Superfund getting its house in
order, and developing and enhancing the organizational structure and
management systems necessary to get the job done, with cleanup
progress accelerating by the end of the decade .... The early slow
pace of the program stemmed, in part, from the difficulty of moving
ahead before program policies, procedures, roles, and responsibilities
were clearly defined. Today, the management foundation of
Superfund is solidly in place and is continually being refined and
enhanced.
TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 46, at 33.
49. One federal official said that by the end of this year, 200 cleanups will be
completed, that is, construction of the remedy will be complete. Recent EPA
publications similarly paint a picture of accelerated progress. According to one recent
EPA publication, as of January 1993, remedy construction had been completed at 155
sites. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL FACt SHEET: SUPERFUND PROGRESS (1993) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL FACT SHEET]. EPA expects to have construction completed at 200
sites by the end of fiscal year 1993, and at 650 sites by the year 2000. OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB.
No. 9200.1-12-3, SUPERFUND PROGRESS FALL/WINTER 1992 (1993) [hereinafter
SUPERFUND PROGRESS]. According to a recent notice by EPA, remedy construction is
deemed complete when one of the following requirements is fulfilled: (I) the necessary
physical construction is finished, regardless of whether or not final cleanup levels have
been met; (2) EPA has determined that no construction is necessary for implementation
of the response action; or (3) the site qualifies for deletion from the NPL. 58 Fed. Reg.
12,142 (1993); New Construction Complete Definition to Include Sites Deleted From
NPL, SUPERFUND REP., Mar. 10, 1993, at 19.
In her recent statement to Congress, Administrator Browner provided updated
numbers on construction completions and other categories of Superfund work, stating
that EPA has completed construction at 164 sites; that remedial investigations and
feasibility studies ("RI/FSs") are underway or have been completed at almost 1200
sites; that remedies have been selected at 800 sites; that remedial designs are underway
or have been completed at nearly 700 sites; and that remedial actions are underway or
have been completed at nearly 500 sites. Browner, supra note 46, at 4. The various
stages of the Superfund cleanup process, including RIIFSs, selection of remedies, design
of the remedy, and construction of the remedy, are discussed in detail in Starfield,
supra note 4, at 10,230-51.
50. Last year, according to EPA Administrator Browner, PRPs conducted more than
70% of the cleanups that were initiated (up from 32% in 1988). Browner, supra note
46, at 4. EPA also reports that 72% of cleanups initiated in FY 1992 were being
conducted by PRPs. ENVIRONMENTAL FACT SHEET, supra note 49.
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touted the removal program as an unpublicized success, as it has abated
hundreds of imminent problems."
Several state officials, despite their criticisms of certain features
of the federal Superfund program, echoed the view that the federal
Superfund program has changed for the better. One state official said
that the "newer generation of cases is being pushed through quickly ...
EPA knows what it's doing. At this point [Superfund is] much less
broke than it used to be." Another state official commented that "the
[federal Superfund] program is basically sound now." A third state
official said that he did not favor delegating the federal Superfund
program to the states because in his view, among other reasons, "the
program is working now."
The broader issue of the performance of the federal Superfund
program is relevant to this more narrowly focused Article for two
reasons. First, this Article's main purpose is to educate the reader on the
issue of federal/state relations to help the reader make overall judgments
on the appropriate future of the federal Superfund program. One purpose
for raising this overarching issue in this Article is to suggest that the
reader not automatically embrace the conventional wisdom but instead
ask some hard questions and get some hard facts concerning the issue --
How well is Superfund working now? -- before making these judgments.
51. CERCLA authorizes EPA to respond in two ways to hazardous substance sites --
"removal actions" or "remedial actions." EPA recently described the difference: "The
Removal Program responds quickly to emergencies where hazardous materials are, or
may be, released. The Remedial Program is dedicated to long-term cleanup of
hazardous waste sites that pose the greatest threat to public health or the environment."
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
REP. NO. 9200.1-12B, SUPERFUND PROGRESS -- AFICIONADO'S VERSION 3 (June 1992)
[hereinafter AFICIONADO'S VERSION]. EPA may institute removals, defined in
CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988), at any site determined to pose a
threat to the public health or welfare or the environment, whether or not the site is on
the National Priorities List ("NPL"). 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b)(2) (1992).
Several interviewees from both the federal and state governments lauded the
removal program. One state official said that the "removal program is the success story
of the federal Superfund program" and that it should be "left alone ... regardless of what
happens with the rest of CERCLA." An EPA regional official said that; if asked, one
of his states would say "get rid of the Region except for the [removal] group." See also
90-DAY STUDY, supra note 30, at 4 ("the removal program is one of Superfund's
biggest unsung success stories").
To date, over 2600 Superfund-financed removals have been completed at both
NPL and non-NPL sites. ENVIRONMENTAL FACT SHEET, supra note 49; Browner,
supra note 46, at 3.
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Second, the issue of whether Superfund is producing significant
results is relevant to the narrower issue of federal/state relations. To
paraphrase one of the interviewees, in deciding whether to fix something,
one must first decide whether it is broken, and if it is broken, how
serious are the problems. Whether one concludes that radical change is
needed in federal/state relations may well depend upon whether one
believes that the Superfund program as a whole is fundamentally flawed
and thereby warrants radical change. Further, one's view of the current
program also may shape one's view as to the nature of any transition to
a new federal/state relationship. Concerning this second point, discussed
in more detail in Section III, many of the federal officials interviewed
urged that if a decision is made to change the program dramatically by
adopting a "delegation model," such a shift should include adequate
transition to avoid losing the gains of the past several years. They note
that such transition would minimize the disruption inherent in
demobilizing the federal Superfund infrastructure that has taken twelve
years to build and that they believe is now producing impressive results.
With this very brief history of the Superfund program, summary
of some of the major issues currently confronting the federal government
involving CERCLA, and introduction to the sentiments of some of the
interviewees on the performance of the federal Superfund program in
general, the Article now turns to the issue at hand -- the appropriate role
for states in the federal Superfund program.
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II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52
This Section contains two basic sets of findings. Finding One
contains an overall observation of the current state of the federal/state
relationship. It provides a context for the findings and recommendations
that follow. Findings Two through Seven identify specific
recommendations to strengthen the current federal/state relationship.
A. Finding One: The current federal/state relationship is a
patchwork
CERCLA explicitly requires EPA to "promulgate regulations
providing for substantial and meaningful involvement by each State in
the initiation, development, and selection of remedial actions to be
undertaken in the State."53  EPA's Superfund regulations establish
procedures for the creation of EPA/state Superfund Memoranda of
Agreement ("SMOA"). 54 SMOAs generally define the relationship
between EPA and the state for both EPA-initiated and state-lead
responses."
52. The federal government needs to resolve two sets of issues relating to these
findings and recommendations. First, substantively, the federal government should
decide what changes to make in the federal/state relationship. Second, procedurally,
the federal government should select an appropriate vehicle for making such changes -
- statutory change, regulatory change or change in agency practice.
EPA urged recently that it be given an opportunity to make administrative fixes
to the program before statutory tinkering begins, but acknowledged that some legislative
action may be needed. Browner Says She'll Try Agency Fixes Before Making
Legislative Recommendations, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA), at 1506 (May 19, 1993); EPA
Focuses on Administrative Fixes for Reauthorization Process, SUPERFUND REPORT,
May 19, 1993, at 3 ("EPA has launched two workgroups -- one comprising Superfund
stakeholders outside the agency and the other made up of agency officials -- to review
options for reform ..... The latter will concentrate on ways to improve the program
administratively .... "). EPA and Congress will proceed on parallel tracks -- Congress
will pursue the reauthorization process while EPA simultaneously seeks to improve the
program through administrative measures. The likely outcome is a reauthorized statute
whose scope to some extent will be affected by the success, or lack of success, of
EPA's administrative fixes.
53. CERCLA § 121(f)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(0(1) (1988). See also 40 C.F.R. §§
300.500-.520 (1992) (regulations regarding state involvement in hazardous substance
response).
54. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.505 (1992).
55. See id.
19931
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CERCLA itself, as well as EPA's Superfund regulations and
guidance, merely provides a procedure through which EPA and the states
may define their relationship. 6 States differ dramatically in their
interest in doing Superfund work and in their ability to perform such
work. Thus, the current federal/state relationship on Superfund matters
is a patchwork.
EPA's 50-State Study" is probably the most complete reference
on the capabilities and resources of all fifty states, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico in the Superfund arena. As the study notes,
assessing state capability is complicated due to the dynamic nature of
state programs.58 Nevertheless, the study reflects that the capabilities
and resources of states vary dramatically.
For example, whereas one-fifth of the states have dedicated more
than one hundred staff personnel to Superfund matters, another one-fifth
have allotted fewer than ten people to this effort. 9 Similarly, states
differ significantly in their enforcement authority. The authors of the 50-
State Study, 1991 Update note that under CERCLA liability is strict, and
joint and several, but that "It]his is not the case with many of the State
* programs."6 Thirty-six states have adopted a strict liability standard,
but fourteen states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have not.6
Finally, the states differ with regard to their financial commitment. Four
states have more than $50 million in fund balances available to them, but
thirteen states have less than $1 million available.62 Other studies of
state capabilities similarly have found significant differences between and
among states.63
56. See id.
57. See 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note 5.
58. Id. at 7.
59. id. at 66.
60. Id at 32.
61. Id. at 102.
62. Id. at 22.
63. See, e.g., STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42. The U.S. General Accounting
Office ("GAO") noted that "[w]hile most states have accomplished few or no cleanups,
some have ... achieved considerable results .... Progress in long-term cleanup activity
is concentrated in few states. About four-fifths of the ... completed cleanups were
done by six states. A third of the reporting states have not completed any cleanups."
Id. at 3-4. Later in its report, GAO states more generally that "[olur review showed
that states are not all equally prepared to assume responsibility for the cleanup of ...
NPL sites." Id at 63. See also Government Operations Hearing, supra note 42, at 60,
67 (prepared statement of Jonathan Z. Cannon, Acting Assistant Administrator, Office
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EPA regions also differ in their philosophies toward state
involvement. For example, based on the interviews, EPA's regions
apparently follow different approaches in involving states in federal
Superfund enforcement efforts. Although the regions agree that
CERCLA authorizes states to serve as the enforcement lead for National
Priorities List ("NPL") sites,' interviewees from one EPA region said
that they do not sign cooperative agreements that give states the
enforcement lead at NPL sites. In contrast, other EPA regions are
prepared to allow states to take the lead.
Any restructuring of the system, such as authorizing states to
select remedies or authorizing states to commit federal Superfund money
towards remedies without EPA concurrence, needs to account for the
reality of this patchwork relationship.
B. Finding Two: The federal government should actively seek to
"leverage" its own Superfund resources by doing what it can to
strengthen state Superfund programs.
The federal Superfund program today only addresses a small
percentage of the hazardous waste sites in this country that need
attention. The federal government focuses the vast majority of its
activity on sites that are listed on the federal NPL, the EPA generated list
of sites warranting long-term remedial evaluation and response.6 As
of March 31, 1992, the NPL listed 1275 sites.66 To put this number
into context, estimates of the total number of sites requiring cleanup
range from 28,000 to 450,000.67 As many interviewees stressed, the
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency) (noting that
the 50-State Study, which was completed "in order to provide a comprehensive
overview of the current status of development by States of ... capabilities to address
Superfund-type hazardous waste problems" indicates that state capabilities vary widely).
64. See CERCLA § 121(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(0(1) (establishing minimum level of
state involvement); see generally 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1992) (establishing the NPL
as an EPA-generated list of sites warranting remedial evaluation and response)
65. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b); Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,228.
66. See AFICIONADO'S VERSION, supra note 51, at 4. EPA expects this number to
grow to more than 2000 sites by the end of the century. Id. In its 1989 report, Coming
Clean, OTA projects that the NPL could ultimately include more than 10,000 sites.
COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 125.
67. STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 3; Government Operations Hearing,
supra note 42, at 2 (opening statement of Chairman Mike Synar) ("States have already
identified 28,000 hazardous waste sites in need of attention and the number may
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federal Superfund program represents only the tip of the iceberg in terms
of the hazardous waste site problem in this country.6"
States have developed their own staffs, sources of funding and
expertise to address many of these Superfund sites.69 As of December
2, 1991, states employed a total of 3656 people on Superfund matters
and had more than $2.2 billion in unobligated funds and authorized
bonds available for Superfund projects.7" The federal government
should restructure the federal Superfund program to maximize the
effectiveness of these state Superfund programs.71
The federal government should take two concrete steps to
ultimately grow as high as 130,000 to 450,000 nationwide"). New York State's
Department of Environmental Conservation projects that at least 700 sites will require
remediation in that state alone. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE:
7TH ANNUAL EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE
REMEDIATION PROGRAM, STATE SUPERFUND MANAGEMENT BOARD 1 (Jan. 1, 1993).
68. See also Governors to Develop Superfund Reauthorization Position, SUPERFUND
REP., Feb. 24, 1993, at 7-8 ("The [Sjuperfund program handles less than 10% of the
hazardous waste cleanups. The remainder are conducted under other federal programs
or state superfund programs"); COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 13 ("Superfund is just
the visible tip of an expanding national pyramid of cleanup programs"). As EPA itself
recognized in 1991 in Ten Years of Progress, "[alfter 10 years of experience, the most
important lesson that all Superfund participants have learned is that the program faces
a workload stretching well into the next century." TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra
note 46, at 36.
69. See generally 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note 5.
70. Id. at 5, 22.
71. Because of these thousands of sites and the existence of state Superfund programs,
several federal official interviewees urged that the success of the federal Superfund
program be judged by more than EPA statistics alone. They said that the existence of
the federal Superfund program has provided leverage to facilitate cleanups at state
Superfund sites, and the program similarly has provided the impetus for thousands of
cleanups conducted by private parties without any governmental involvement
whatsoever.
These interviewees are right. EPA and others should develop a better
understanding of the accomplishments of these state programs and a better grasp of the
thousands of cleanups that Superfimd has induced private parties to perform without
any governmental involvement. One high ranking EPA official told the author that
EPA needs to integrate better EPA and state data systems so that the government can
develop information concerning the total amount of cleanup and other activity occurring
under government auspices.
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accomplish this result." First, the federal government should give
states the authority to serve as the "gatekeepers" for the federal NPL.73
This change would enable states to use the NPL as the "guerilla in the
closet" to induce liable parties to cooperate with states under state
Superfund programs, thereby eliminating the need for the federal
government to address such sites. Second, the federal government should
use the federal Superfund law to improve the efficiency of state programs
by extending CERCLA's section 121(e) permit exemption requirement
to cleanups conducted under capable state programs. 74
1. The federal government should give states the authority to serve
as the "gatekeepers" for the National Priorities List.
One interviewee noted that the federal Superfund program is
viewed as creating "so much jeopardy" that "people treat it like the
plague."05 The federal government should structure the federal program
to make it possible for states to warn responsible parties that if they do
not cooperate with the states' program, their sites will go on the NPL, by
giving states control over the listing of sites on the NPL.76 Another
federal interviewee who supported this approach said that EPA has used
72. The following suggestions for restructuring the federal Superfund program to
increase the leverage of state Superfund programs assume that the federal government
retains the current structure of two sets of sites -- a relatively small number of sites on
the federal list and a large number of other sites needing attention. One framework for
handling hazardous waste sites would entail eliminating the current "two list"
framework, and instead creating a single comprehensive list of sites needing
investigation and cleanup. See discussion infra part III.C.
73. See generally supra note 64 (discussing the function of the NPL).
74. CERCLA § 121(e)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(1) (1988), provides in pertinent part:
"No Federal, State, or local permit shall be required for the portion of any removal or
remedial action conducted entirely onsite, where such remedial action is selected and
carried out in compliance with this section." See also 40 C.F.R. § 300.400(e)(1992);
55 Fed. Reg. 8688-92 (1990); Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,234.
75. Commentators have used different words to convey the same message: "Presence
on the NPL is often the economic death knell for a property because it renders the land
essentially unmarketable and foreshadows years of costly work." Kass & Gerrard,
supra note 34, at 4.
76. States do not currently have this leverage. For example, EPA does not need state
concurrence to list a site on the NPL. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(e)(2) (1992). Further, states
may nominate a site for the NPL, but EPA retains full control over whether it is listed.
40 C.F.R. § 300.515(c). In contrast, EPA cannot delete a site from the NPL until the
affected state concurs in the deletion. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(e)(2).
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the NPL to great advantage to leverage cleanups at Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") sites."
EPA requested comment on two alternative approaches to
deferring sites to states in its 1988 proposed revisions to the 1990
National Contingency Plan ("NCP").7s According to one of the primary
authors of this regulation, deferral received the most public comments of
any concept in the proposed regulations.79 EPA responded to this
pressure by disbanding the work group it had established to address the
matter and putting the issue on the back burner.8  In short, EPA
deferred addressing the deferral issue.
In its evaluation, the United States General Accounting Office
("GAO") appeared to urge a "go slow" approach to deferral,.based in part
on the variable capabilities of state Superfund programs.
Most states' ability to effectively clean up large, complex
77. In addition to its function as a "cradle-to-grave" management scheme, see supra
note 31, RCRA also authorizes EPA to require parties to clean up releases of hazardous
wastes under certain circumstances. See, e.g., RCRA §§ 3004(u)-(v), 3008, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6924(u)-(v), 6928 (1988). According to several federal interviewees, EPA induces
parties to perform these remedial obligations under RCRA by threatening to treat the
facility as a federal Superfund site. A related benefit of allowing states to control the
listing of NPL sites is that it would reduce duplication of effort by ensuring that the
federal government process was not applied to, and federal resources were not spent on,
a site where state resources already were involved. Several interviewees urged this
change. One official urged that EPA "make the 'D' [deferral) word legal." In other
words, if a state program is capable of handling a site, the state should be allowed to
handle the site, and the state should not be required to go through the process of
scoring and listing a site on the NPL.
In its report, GAO lists other benefits of deferral which states also identified:
(1) reduced delays in starting cleanups; (2) expedited cleanups; (3) encouragement of
PRPs to clean up sites; (4) less expensive cleanups; and (5) allowing states to act on
their own policies and requirements. STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 61-62.
78. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,415-22 (1988). EPA requested comment on expanding the
deferral of sites to other federal authorities, as well as to states. Id.
Section 105 of CERCLA mandates the maintenance of the NCP. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605. EPA implements the NCP by regulation. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.1105. "The
purpose of the ... [NCP] is to provide the organizational structure and procedures for
preparing and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances,
pollutants, and contaminants." Id. § 300.1.
79. Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,242; Government Operations Hearing, supra note 42,
at 67 (prepared statement of Jonathan Z. Cannon).
80. Id.
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hazardous waste sites has not been demonstrated. For this
reason and to preserve fair, consistent treatment of
responsible parties and the public, GAO believes that EPA
should proceed with deferral of Superfund sites only if it
can ensure that state cleanups of deferred sites are at least
as protective as Superfund requires."'
GAO concluded:
Our review showed that some states have large hazardous
waste site programs and considerable experience with site
cleanup. Some form of deferral may be workable.
However, for several reasons we believe that any deferral
policy should have stronger controls over cleanup than the
deferral proposal establishes. First, most of the 50 states
have little experience with the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites. Several of the states we visited had new programs,
small staffs, and not enough funds to clean up many sites
without support from responsible parties. The ability of
most states to clean up hazardous waste sites
independently has not been demonstrated. A recent EPA
Inspector General report criticized states for inadequately
performing their Superfund site "lead" responsibilities. 82
In sum, the primary concerns GAO articulated in counseling
restraint concerning deferral are: (1) Many states lack the financial and
other capabilities to handle sites on their own; and (2) as a result,
deferral may result in delay in remediating sites or in inadequate
remediation.8 3 GAO also believed that EPA's 1988 deferral proposal
81. STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 3.
82. Id. at 68.
83. According to the GAO, deferral should be considered only when the state makes
adequate assurances that it has the regulatory authority, the personnel, and the funding
to conduct a CERCLA style cleanup. Even then, deferral should be subject to strict
EPA oversight to ensure that the site is remediated in a timely manner and is consistent
with the NCP. STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 59-69; see also Government
Operations Hearing, supra note 42, at 36 (testimony of Richard L. Hembra); COMING
CLEAN, supra note 38, at 13, 62, 197, 200-01, 214-15. OTA criticized deferral, stating
that "[t]here is no evidence to suggest that programs other than Superfund are more
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failed to adequately define the nature and extent of EPA oversight. s
GAO's concerns relating to deferral are legitimate. Allowing
such concerns to derail the entire effort to defer sites in situations for
which capable states are willing to handle them, however, is misguided
and counterproductive. This strategy of inaction, which has now been
in place for several years, is contrary to the federal government's
ultimate objective in terms of the states' role in the Superfund program.
Given the enormous scope of the hazardous waste site problem and the
federal government's resource constraints, the federal government should
be maximizing the tools that state governments have to accomplish
timely and effective cleanups.
Accordingly, the federal government should change its policy to
allow deferrals. In effecting this change, the federal government should
address the issues concerning state capability that GAO raises. The
federal government should not automatically allow every state to control
listing of sites on the federal NPL. Instead, the federal government
should include safeguards to ensure that vesting states with this
"gatekeeper" responsibility does not delay unduly remediation of sites or
make inadequate efforts at remediation.
One safeguard the federal government should include is that it
should allow only states with "capable" programs to serve as
gatekeepers.8 A second, complementary safeguard is to make deferral
a public process. Requiring public accountability at various stages in the
process, for example, at the time of the initial decision to defer a site, at
efficient, i.e., provide quality cleanup at lower cost to the public." Id at 201. For
additional information on the issue of deferral, see generally Starfield, supra note 4, at
10,242.
A report that a contractor, CH2M Hill, prepared for EPA in 1991 similarly
raises concerns regarding states' financial capability. CH2M Hill projected that by the
year 2000 states would have obligated a total of almost $1.2 billion merely for
operation and maintenance ("0 & M") at NPL sites. This amount does not include
states' 10% cost share for NPL sites, or state expenditures for non-NPL sites. States'
O & M financial obligations must be considered in any evaluation of state capability
to contribute to the remediation of NPL or non-NPL Superfund sites.
84. STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 63, 67-68.
85. In its report, GAO lists four possible criteria for evaluating state programs: (1) a
proven record of cleanup experience with complex, extensively contaminated sites; (2)
a record of successfully negotiating with PRPs; (3) adequate staff and other resources
to clean up sites with government funds; and (4) adequate oversight of PRP sites.
STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 65. See infra note 116 (discussing eight
possible criteria for determining which state programs are "capable").
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periodic intervals in the investigation process and at the completion of
major milestones such as the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study
("RI/FS") and Record of Decision ("ROD"), should enhance state
performance." In a third aspect of this proposed change in the
Superfund program, EPA also should retain a second level "gatekeeper"
function, that is, EPA must concur that. a site poses a risk of significant
magnitude to warrant federal attention and listing on the NPL.Y7
In sum, the federal government should actively encourage deferral
to capable and. interested states, rather than allow issues relating to the
86. In another context, the public accountability created by the toxic release inventory
("TRI") program, which requires companies that generate more than a certain volume
of specific toxic substances to report these releases publicly, is reported to have
contributed to a significant reduction in the generation of these materials. Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11,001-11,050 (West
Supp. 1993); Charles L. Elkins, Toxic Chemicals, the Right Response, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1988, at F3 (stating that it was only in the wake of the TRI program that
many companies "discover[ed] the extent to which they (were] discharging potentially
harmful substances -- not only as a result of plant accidents, but during routine daily
operations as well," and citing as an example that Monsanto had pledged to reduce its
emissions into the air by 90% by the end of 1992). Given the large number of sites the
logistics of such an approach, including such issues as whether all non-NPL sites
should proceed through a formal public deferral process or whether some prioritization
of sites should occur first with only the higher priority sites proceeding through this
process, need to be evaluated and resolved.
Citizen interviewees and GAO favored more federal oversight of non-NPL site
work to ensure that states move the sites in a timely way, which the citizen
interviewees believe are more readily subject to political pressure from industry. One
federal official indicated his view that because of resource limitations it is unrealistic
to expect EPA to monitor non-NPL sites. As a general matter, and with respect to
Superfund in particular, the federal government needs to develop newer, better ways
of measuring state performance. The federal government should maximize the number
of government employees on the front lines handling cases or sites and minimize the
number of employees engaged in oversight activities. One strategy would be to
maximize the use of creative approaches, such as public disclosure, to strengthen state
performance, and to minimize resource-intensive, case-specific review and oversight.
87. EPA currently possesses such authority, with one qualification: CERCLA
authorizes states to designate their "highest priority facility" for NPL listing, and EPA
must list such facilities on the NPL, regardless of their hazard ranking score. CERCLA
§ 105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c) (1992). One
component of this issue that the federal government should consider is whether its
function as the second level gatekeeper should be to exercise de novo review, or
whether it should give substantial deference to states' judgments when the states have
demonstrated their capability to make sound decisions.
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capability of some states to serve as a road block to enhanced state
efforts to clean up sites.88
2. The federal government should use the federal Superfund law to
improve the efficiency of state programs by extending the section
121(e) permit exemption requirement to cleanups conducted under
capable state programs.89
Ordinarily, actions to treat or dispose of hazardous substances
require permits. For example, constructing a landfill for the disposal of
hazardous waste requires a permit under RCRA. 9° The purpose of such
a permit requirement is two-fold. 9' First, the requirement ensures that
the appropriate environmental regulatory agency has reviewed the
proposed operation. The agency has determined that the operation meets
regulatory requirements and therefore will not present an unreasonable
risk to public health or the environment.92  Second, the permit
requirement provides a forum for the public to participate in the
process. 93 The downside to the permit process is that it takes time and
88. In a June 1993 report, EPA acknowledges the appropriateness of using the NPL
as a tool to strengthen states' efforts to clean up sites under state Superfund programs.
EPA's proposed strategy, however, appears to allow less leverage to states than states
would have as gatekeepers to the NPL. Under EPA's proposed approach, the decision
concerning how best to handle non-NPL sites would be a mutual one involving both
EPA and the states, rather than a unilateral one. EPA would only cede control over
certain types of non-NPL sites, those sites that are low or medium priority NPL-caliber
sites. U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFIND ADMINISTRATIVE
IMPROVEMENTS, FINAL REPORT 33-36 (June 23, 1993). EPA's administrative shift,
while a step in the right direction, falls short in allowing states to maximize their
leverage to induce PRP cleanups of non-NPL sites that the threat of NPL listing creates.
89. See supra note 74 (setting forth CERCLA permit requirement).
90. RCRA § 3005(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
91. Permits play an important role in the environmental regulatory scheme. Because
EPA operates mainly through legislative rules, permits serve to "apply the Agency's
legislative rules to individual pollution sources and hazardous waste management
facilities." I LAW OF ENvTL. PROTECTION, ENVTL. LAW INSTITUTE § 3.06[1], at 3-44
(Sheldon M. Novick, ed. 1993). Not only does the permit process clearly set out each
discharger's obligations, but the process also makes enforcement of these defined
obligations a much easier task. Id. Presently, five EPA-administered statutes
incorporate permitting systems. Id. at 3-45.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 624.3-5 (1992) (providing for a
public hearing process).
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delays cleanup.94
CERCLA explicitly frees EPA from having to obtain permits for
the on-site remedies it selects under Superfund. 9' For example, if a
Superfund remedy involves building an on-site treatment facility, no
permit is needed, even though that facility ordinarily would require a
RCRA permit. The remedy must meet all of the substantive
requirements of such a permit, and the government must provide
equivalent opportunities for public input into the decision-making
process, but the party building the facility need not go through the actual
permit process.96
The rationale for this approach is that the CERCLA cleanup
process is the functional equivalent of the permit process and provides
adequate assurance that the government is satisfied with the proposed
operation.97 The approach also ensures sufficient opportunity for the
94. As one state official interviewee said, the need for permits hinders cleanups. He
said that the RCRA permit process takes approximately two and a half years. He
further noted that the permit process and remediation are not a good fit. Permits are
designed for facilities that will remain in operation for years while remediation often
involves short-term operation. In addition, ordinarily, a choice of location is involved
for a permit, while in the remediation context no choice exists. He suggested a need
for balance and a variance procedure to address these factors. See also OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
OSWER DIRECTIVE No., 9355.7-03, PERMITS AND PERMIT "EQUIVALENCY"
PROCESSES FOR CERCLA ON-SITE RESPONSE ACTIONS 4 (1992) [hereinafter PERMITS
GUIDANCE]; Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,234.
95. CERCLA § 121(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 300.400(e) (1992). See
supra note 74.
96. Id; see also Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,234 n.133 & n.137.
97. As EPA notes in the preamble to the 1990 NCP:
CERCLA actions should not be delayed by time-consuming and
duplicative administrative requirements such as permitting, although
the remedies should achieve the substantive standards of applicable or
relevant and appropriate laws .... EPA's approach is wholly
consistent with the overall goal of the Superfund program, to achieve
expeditious cleanups, and reflects an understanding of the uniqueness
of the CERCLA program, which directly impacts more than one
medium (and thus overlaps with a number of other regulatory and
statutory programs). Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to
formally subject CERCLA response actions to the multitude of
administrative requirements of other federal and state offices and
agencies.
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public to participate in this process.9" The same rationale for exempting
cleanup decisions from the permit process applies to "capable" state
programs. Accordingly, the federal government should extend this
exemption to states that it deems capable of selecting such remedies and
that have adequate procedural safeguards in place, such as the right of
citizens to participate fully in the remedy selection process.99
55 Fed. Reg. 8756 (1990); see also Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,234. The
interpretation that cleanups need not comply with the administrative requirements of
other laws "was historically based on the position that CERCLA actions must be
allowed to proceed expeditiously and that compliance with administrative and
procedural provisions would slow down CERCLA actions. Moreover, the NCP sets out
a detailed set of procedures of its own that CERCLA actions must follow; these render
unnecessary the procedures of other environmental programs". Id
98. See CERCLA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1988).
99. While some state programs include provisions similar to CERCLA § 121(e), see,
e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 375-1.7 (1992), others may not. EPA
indicates its view that this exemption does apply to states under certain circumstances,
primarily if a state has "lead" agency status and is "operating pursuant to a contract or
cooperative agreement executed pursuant to CERCLA section 104(d)(1), under which
EPA selects (or must approve) the remedy." PERMITS GUIDANCE, supra note 94, at 2-3.
To the extent that this guidance limits the state-selected remedies to which this
exemption from permitting applies, the federal government should expand this
exemption so that it applies to any state-selected remedial action when EPA has
determined that the state is "capable" and has adequate procedural protections for
citizen input.
Several states, including New Jersey and Massachusetts, recently have
instituted voluntary cleanup programs that, to some extent, are distinct from their
Superfund programs. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C (1993). Interviewees
believed that the federal government should revamp the federal Superfund program to
give these states leverage to encourage the voluntary cleanup of these sites by giving
the state control over the listing of these sites on the NPL. The issuing of a permit
exemption would depend on whether the remedial process for these sites is the
functional equivalent of the permit process.
In addition to these options for restructuring the federal Superfund programs
to strengthen state Superfund programs, the obvious suggestion of strengthening state
programs exists through the provision of direct federal resource support. This
suggestion makes sense if used selectively to build state programs that are more
effective than EPA strengthening its own program. EPA currently provides non-site-
specific funding tofstates to build state Superfund programs, known as the Core
program. STATE INVOLVEMENT, supra note 40, at 25 ("The Core Program enables EPA
to fund non-site-specific activities that are essential for states to administer their
Superfund program and to play an active role in site-specific cleanups"). See also
Government Operations Hearing, supra note 42, at 63 (prepared statement of Jonathan
Z. Cannon).
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C. Finding Three: The federal government should actively seek to
"leverage" its own resources by doing what it can to encourage
greater state involvement in the federal Superfund program.
In addition to making changes to the federal Superfund program
that will strengthen state Superfund programs, the federal government
should take steps to increase state involvement in the federal Superfund
program itself.
Both state interest and capability in Superfund matters have
increased in recent years."° For example, states already play an active
role in the preliminary stages of investigating federal Superfund sites.
States conduct more than sixty percent of preliminary assessments and
more than thirty percent of site investigations.0°
EPA should continue to help build this state capability and take
advantage of it by increasing the states' role in the federal Superfund
100. 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note 5, at 5-8 & Table V-I. The authors
of this study report that, comparing the 1989 and 1990 data concerning expansion of
state programs with the 1991 data, "the States' programs have continued to develop, but
... the changes are less dramatic and more incremental than was the case in the late
1980s." Id at 5.
101. TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 46, at 31.
CERCLA activity at a site begins with a two-phase evaluation consisting of a
preliminary assessment ("PA") and a site inspection ("SI"). 40 C.F.R. § 300.500
(1992). A PA is undertaken at a site when (1) the site has been placed on the
CERCLIS database; or (2) a release or threat of release that is eligible for CERCLA
response has occurred at the site. 40 C.F.R. § 300.420(b)(1), (5)(iv)(A)-(B). EPA has
made it a policy to conduct a PA at a site within one year of its inclusion on CERCLIS.
See TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 46, at I1. The PA involves identifying the
nature and source of the release, exposure pathways, and potential exposure targets
through historical searches, and a regulatory file review. 40 C.F.R. § 420(b)(2). Where
information gathered during the PA indicates that further investigation of the site is
warranted, an SI is conducted. Id § 420(b)(4)(iii). The SI consists of more detailed
on and off site investigation, sampling, and sample analysis. Id § 420(c)(2).
States have played a less prominent role in conducting remedial
investigation/featuring studies. "[Tlhe purpose of the remedial investigation/feasibility
study (RI/FS) is to assess site conditions and evaluate [remedial] alternatives to the
extent necessary to select a remedy." Id § 300.430(a)(2). In the preliminary
assessments of the RIFS, states led the process between 1980 and 1990. The
individual states' involvement and authority varied significantly between EPA regions -
- from 10% in Region 7 to 30% in Region 2. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECrION AGENCY,
SUMMARY OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM (1990). On average,
states conducted approximately 16% of the RI/FSs during this ten-year span. See TEN
YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 46, at 31.
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program, that is, EPA should be leveraging its resources by bringing
states into the federal Superfund program as much as possible. 02
Based on the interviews, a primary area in which EPA historically
has limited state involvement is remedy selection. In the NCP, EPA
indicates that as a matter of policy, it will make all the remedy selection
decisions for federal NPL sites.'03 Some interviewees suggested that
102. EPA has acknowledged the need to include states to a greater extent in the federal
Superfund program:
EPA recognizes that many more sites need to be addressed than
present CERCLA resources can accommodate; by deferring some
problem sites to the States, EPA believes more overall response
actions can be accomplished more quickly, and EPA can direct its
resources to sites that otherwise would not be addressed.
53 Fed. Reg. 51,418 (1988).
103. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e); see also 55 Fed. Reg. 8783 (1990) ("EPA believes ... that
it is not appropriate at this time to turn over the final decision-making authority on
remedy selection to states. ... EPA believes that it should retain primary responsibility
for the federal Superfund program. ... Further, keeping the final responsibility for
remedy selection within EPA (rather than dividing it among the 50 states and EPA)
furthers the goal of ensuring consistency among remedies implemented at sites."). But
see Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,242-43 (discussing the predominant sentiment among
states that EPA should delegate the remedy selection power to the states rather than
retaining this power itself). For arguments related to the appropriate role of states
under CERCLA and the NCP, see Brief for the Respondent at 111-23, Ohio v. EPA,
997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 86-1096); Amended Joint Opening Brief of
Petitioners at 93-120, Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 86-1096);
Joint Reply Brief of Petitioners at 43-53, Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(No. 86-1096).
The one exception to EPA's insistence on retaining ultimate remedy selection
authority involves non-Fund-financed, state lead enforcement sites (i.e., sites that states
will manage and for which states will not require federal funds to accomplish
remediation). 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(2)(i) (1992) (the author was unable to determine
how many sites have been addressed under this section). An EPA guidance document
provides that EPA and states should enter into site-specific agreements concerning such
sites that specify schedules for the state to meet in addressing the site. OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
OSWER DiRECTIVE No. 9831.9, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE STATE ROLE
IN REMEDY SELECTION AT NON-FUND-FNANCED ENFORCEMENT SITES 3 (Apr. 18,
1991) [hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS]. To the best of the author's knowledge,
no such agreements have been consummated. Telephone conversation with Jan Baker,
Special Assistant, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. EPA (July 14,
1993). Based on information drawn from EPA's CERCLA Information System
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EPA may be slowly starting to move away from this policy. However,
EPA should be much more aggressive in its integration of interested and
"capable" states into the federal Superfund program. The agency's goal
should be to have such states assume responsibility for entire sites, from
site investigation through remediation, so that EPA can turn to sites for
which states are not in a position to play a significant role.
To summarize Findings Two and Three, the federal government's
underlying philosophy towards the federal/state relationship needs to be
based on the reality that EPA cannot handle on its own the vast number
of sites that currently need attention. The federal government's
fundamental objective in terms of the federal/state relationship should be
to leverage federal resources by (1) structuring the federal program to
make state programs as effective as possible and (2) integrating states
and state resources as much as possible into the effort to address federal
Superfund sites. EPA should be soliciting actively state involvement in
this work and be helping to develop states' capabilities to conduct it.'"
("CERCLIS") database, see generally infra Section II.G.4, states have overseen a total
of 36 PRP-funded RI/FSs with no federal funding, and a total of 12 PRP-funded
remedial designs and 12 remedial actions with no federal funding since the program's
inception in 1980.
104. The two suggestions made in the text to improve in this area -- taking actions to
strengthen state programs' handling of non-NPL sites and better integrating states into
the federal program involving NPL sites -- assume that Congress will retain the federal
NPL. The NPL is an artificial construct, a subset of the sites throughout the country
that require attention. Consequently, the existence of the NPL creates a need to divide
the universe of sites into two subsets: NPL sites and non-NPL sites. The suggestions
in the text relate to improved federal use of state resources within this construct.
Alternative Three, see supra Section III.C, embodies a more radical approach
to leveraging federal resources through greater use of state resources. This alternative
involves dismantling the existing NPL approach, developing a comprehensive list of
sites that need ttention, and dividing these sites between EPA and the states.
1993]
40 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMETAL LAW [Vol. 18:01
D. Finding Four: The federal government should streamline the
Superfund process to improve efficiency in the use offederal and
state resources. 105
The federal government should structure the federal Superfund
program to avoid squandering the additional resources gained for the
program through state involvement. Indeed, to the extent the federal
government is successful in helping to strengthen state capability and in
convincing states to participate actively in the federal Superfund
program, EPA and state officials should not lose these gains by spending
significant amounts of time duplicating efforts or double-checking each
other's work. To the maximum extent possible, the governments should
be working as a team, with functions and responsibilities clearly
delineated and with a minimal amount of overlap built into the system.
The program should be designed to facilitate a more efficient,
105. While beyond the scope of this Article, many people have called for streamlining,
or compressing, the current several-year time frame to investigate and clean up sites.
Administrator Browner has acknowledged this criticism, and stated that the "average
time from an initial RI/S to completion of a remedial action project at a Superfund
NPL sites is 10 years." Browner, supra note 46, at 7.
The recently proposed Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model ("SACM")
approach (described in a publication by the OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTh. PROTECTION AGENCY, DIRECTIVE No. 9203.1-03, GUIDANCE
ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUPERFUND ACCELERATED CLEANUP MODEL (SACM)
UNDER CERCLA AND NCP (July 7, 1992)) is one effort EPA has made to streamline
the overall program. Another recently reported example of the federal government's
effort to streamline the federal Superflud program is the recent "launch[ing] [of] a
major effort" by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR") to
streamline the assessment of public health hazards at Superfund sites. ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ALERT, May 26, 1993, at 16.
The SACM model was of concern to several state officials, because the model
has the potential to blur the lines of responsibility between states and EPA, and
therefore disrupt relations between the two governments. The SACM directive fails to
discuss the appropriate state role in the "SACM model." One state official noted that
to the extent that EPA intends to use its removal authorities to address sites that states
previously would address, or to deal with parts of sites that states previously would
address, the SACM model obviously carries with it the seeds for major disruptions in
federal/state relations. One federal interviewee responded to this concern by saying that
SACM is not intended to expand the universe of sites that EPA addresses.
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streamlined and less hierarchical working relationship."o
Several interviewees called for a fundamental shift in the
federal/state partnership at sites. Currently, the relationship at most state
sites is one of "lead agency" and "support agency." 1
07
This system inherently creates the likelihood of redundant effort
and inevitably leads to conflicts. For example, for the vast majority of
sites at which a state serves as the "lead agency," the state enters into a
"cooperative agreement" with EPA under which EPA funds the state's
performance of its responsibilities.'" The regulations provide that a
cooperative agreement is a "legal instrument EPA uses to transfer money
... to a recipient to accomplish a public purpose in which substantial
[EPA] involvement is anticipated during the performance of the
106. Administrator Browner has discussed the overlap in responsibilities inherent in
the current federal/state relationship:
The EPA/State relationship has been strained in some areas. The law
assures state involvement in all aspects of Superfund .... The law also
requires cleanups to meet the requirements of state environmental
laws more stringent than federal requirements. Moreover, states are
responsible for paying a percentage of the cost of remedial actions ....
Because so much responsibility -- and cost -- is shared, the federal
and state governments sometimes disagree on issues such as remedy
selection, enforcement, and long-term state operation and maintenance
costs at Superfund sites.
Browner, supra note 46, at 8.
In the 1986 SARA Amendments, Congress significantly expanded state
involvement in the federal Superfund program, "assuring," as Administrator Browner
testified, "state involvement in all aspects of Superfund." Id; see also, Government
Operations Hearing, supra note 42, at 58-59 (prepared statement of Jonathan Z.
Cannon) ("In 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)
expanded the scope of State involvement in all phases of hazardous site response under
CERCLA. After SARA's enactment, [EPA] undertook a number of initiatives to
facilitate participation by states .... ).
107. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 300.500(b) (1992) ("EPA shall encourage states to
participate in Fund-financed response in two ways. ... [S]tates may either assume the
lead ... for the response action or may be the support agency in EPA-lead remedial
response.").
108. To be the lead agency, a state must enter into a cooperative agreement, known
as a Superfund Memorandum of Agreement ("SMOA"). Id § 300.505(d)(3). The
SMOA specifies schedules and EPA involvement if a state is going to serve as lead
agency, even if the state will not receive federal funds to support its effort. Id
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project.'"' 9  Further, CERCLA guarantees states a right to
"substantially and meaningfully participate" in sites when the federal
government is in the lead, again creating a structure that promotes
overlapping efforts. "0
While EPA has taken steps within this framework in an effort to
minimize redundancy and conflict,"' virtually every government
interviewee stated that the major problem in the federal/state relationship
is duplication of effort. Several interviewees described it as the "two
cooks in the kitchen" syndrome. Other interviewees said that the
agencies spend as much time negotiating between themselves as they do
with PRPs. One state official said that the existing system "impedes
[the] speed and number of cleanups because two levels of government
are reviewing and approving investigations and cleanup plans for the
same sites." Another official noted that duplication of effort occurs
"throughout the entire process. ... The whole concept of lead/support
agency creates redundancy."
The federal government should adopt an alternative framework for
the federal/state relationship. As one federal official said, the state and
federal governments should complement one another rather than oversee
each other. He emphasized that the state and federal governments should
not be working on the same sites, especially considering the large
universe of sites and the inevitability of disagreement. 11
2
As these comments from the interviewees reflect, duplication of
effort is inherent in the current Superfund paradigm for the federal/state
partnership. Superfund is founded upon a lead agency/support agency
relationship, with the support agency having significant rights and, for
EPA, significant responsibilities, rather than a model that is based on
109. Id § 300.5 (emphasis added).
110. Id. § 300.500(a).
S111. Most significantly, EPA created the SMOA, in part, to prevent these conflicts
from arising by "establish[ing] the nature and extent of EPA and state interaction during
EPA-lead and state-lead response" in advance of any site activity. Id. § 300.505(a)
(1992). EPA's 1991 Update reports that as of December 1991, 18 states had entered
into SMOAs with EPA. 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note 5, at 3, 75.
112. Another federal official said that "the more you keep the governments out of each
other's hair, the more we'll get done." A state official articulated that the problem "is
duplication of effort. Either the U.S. EPA or the State should be in charge. We should
pick one or the other." Echoing the same refrain, another federal official said: "The
double teaming is inefficient. It's more efficient for one or the other to do it. Why not
divide up the world?"
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EPA and states performing clearly distinct functions." 3 The federal
government should shift to a paradigm in which sites are divided early
on and efforts are made to minimize the "joint venturing" of sites." 4
113. To some extent, EPA's provision of funding to states exacerbates this duplication
of effort. EPA currently provides funds to states through several different contract
mechanisms: (1) cooperative agreements to fund state efforts for sites for which a state
will serve as "lead agency"; (2) cooperative agreements to fund state efforts for sites
for which a state will serve as the "support agency" with EPA serving as the lead; and
(3) Core agreements to fund non-site-specific state Superfund activity. 50-STATE
STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note 5, at 17.
According to one set of figures drawn from CERCLIS for the two-year period
1991-92, EPA provided states with $135,861,000 to fund "lead agency" activities;
$13,068,000 to fund "support agency" activities; and $33,982,000 for Core grants. EPA
personnel stressed that these numbers are not particularly reliable. Nevertheless, the
numbers are telling from an order of magnitude perspective. On the "plus" side, these
numbers suggest that most federal financial support of states does not go directly to
site-specific "support" activities where overlap is inevitable. On the "down" side, EPA
gave states more than $10 million during this period to review and comment on sites
for which EPA itself was already in the lead. EPA should shift these funds to
encourage a division of functions, not duplication of effort. EPA should seriously
consider eliminating or significantly limiting support to cooperative agreements, and
should instead provide this money to states, as Core grants, to help states build a state
Superfund infrastructure, or as "lead agency" cooperative agreements, in which EPA
should seek to significantly limit its involvement in reviewing and commenting on state
efforts at such sites.
114. Some interviewees disagreed that the existing system results in an undue amount
of duplication of effort. One interviewee said that currently the relationship between
EPA and states is not defined and, therefore, "the states can make it what they want."
One federal official said that "the sophisticated states are already at separate but equal."
One state official said along the same lines: "In [my state], we've come to a pragmatic
separation, not quite a divorce. We try to deal in good faith with mutual respect. We
avoid each other when we can and listen to each other when we have to. It works,
more or less."
Even if some states and regions have worked out arrangements that reduce
duplication of effort, the interviewees appear to suggest that this is because at least
some of these states have reduced their involvement at NPL sites. One state official
indicated that his state played a very active role early on in the remedial process but
that, more recently, the state had deliberately reduced its role considerably. For
example, this particular state almost never takes the lead on an RI/FS for an NPL site.
The interviewee indicated that despite its generally positive relationship with EPA, the
state's decision to move to a lower profile in NPL sites stemmed in part from the
inevitable frustration of being in a subordinate position and having EPA second-guess
its decisions. In addition, the interviewee indicated that one of the reasons for the
state's decision was to allow it to concentrate on the several hundred plus non-NPL
sites in the state. He characterized the state's thinking: "At least EPA will be working
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1. Dividing Sites
As suggested above, the federal government should give states
with "capable" Superfund programs complete responsibility for particular
sites." 5 Several interviewees urged that dividing responsibility for
sites, rather than the current approach of sharing responsibility for them,
will reduce oversight, eliminate duplication of effort and make the
program more efficient." 6
on the NPL sites. If we [the state] do not focus on the non-NPL sites, no one will."
In short, the state's shift in approach stemmed in part from its conclusion that it would
be far more efficient de facto to divide these sites between the two agencies, with the
state handling the several hundred non-NPL sites and EPA handling the relatively small
number of NPL sites, rather than using substantial state resources to address NPL sites
that would receive attention anyway.
115. For those sites at which states would qualify, this strategy essentially represents
an ad hoc version of the "delegation model" for the federal/state relationship. See infra
Section lIl.A.
One issue is whether CERCLA currently authorizes EPA to delegate to states
complete responsibility for NPL sites. In Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1541 (D.C. Cir.
1993), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that EPA has
authority to delegate certain section 104 responsibilities to states, and that EPA's
determination as to whether or not to delegate such authority is "clearly discretionary."
The court, however, ultimately remanded for further explanation of EPA's decision in
Subpart F of the NCP not to allow delegation of the authority to select the final remedy
because this "blanket prohibition ... reflects an inexplicable change in policy." Id at
1542. Thus, EPA currently appears to possess discretion to give states essentially
complete responsibility for sites, but EPA has exercised its discretion to circumscribe
the scope of responsibilities it delegates to states. Unless EPA officials demonstrate
a willingness to change policy, a statutory change may prove necessary.
116. These interviewees recognized that revising the federal/state relationship in this
way raises a multitude of issues. First, under the current NCP, if EPA provides state-
specific financial support for state efforts at such sites under a cooperative agreement,
EPA must be involved substantially in site activities. See supra note 110 and
accompanying text. The federal government needs to change its cooperative
agreements requirements to add flexibility by eliminating the need for such extensive
overlap, or it needs to change the mechanism it uses to provide funds to states. A
second issue that the federal government will need to resolve involves the level of
oversight it should exercise concerning remedy selection in such cases. Currently, the
NCP requires EPA to approve draft and final remedy selection documents before states
may issue them. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(1), (2)(ii) (1992).
Several alternative models exist that would provide EPA oversight for state
action. First, GAO has suggested in its report the most intrusive type of oversight.
GAO recommended that if EPA defers sites, it "should actively review state cleanups
... " STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 67. GAO also noted that a state may
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establish a "history of effectively remediating deferred sites. Less intensive oversight
may be possible at that point." Id Second, as one interviewee suggested, the federal
government should approve state remedies, but should utilize the approach used by
courts in exercising judicial review of an agency action -- a relatively deferential form
of oversight -- rather than de novo review. Third, the federal government should
consider the approach followed under the Clean Water Act, an approach in which EPA
has veto authority rather than approval authority over state-issued National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1988);
40 C.F.R. § 123.44. As the court stated in Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282,
1287 (5th Cir. 1977), EPA is to exercise this veto power "judiciously;" in fact, EPA is
to administer the program "in such a manner that the abilities of the States to control
their own permit programs will be developed and strengthened." Id Finally, the least
intrusive form of oversight would be to focus on the environmental results of the
overall state program, perhaps using an auditing approach, rather than review every
individual site decision.
Thus, a variety of models exist for federal oversight. In theory, all of these
models share the trait of providing less oversight or review than EPA currently
provides. The fundamental point the interviewees made is that oversight "should not
be so overbearing as to defeat its purpose."
A related issue involves determining which site activities EPA should oversee.
Various interviewees identified several options, including (1) the RI/FS work plan, (2)
the draft RI, (3) the proposed plan and ROD, (4) a good faith offer, (5) negotiation time
frames, (6) mixed funding decisions, (7) certification of the remedy, and (8) the five-
year review.
A third issue involves the criteria which the federal government should use to
determine to which states it should defer or with which it should divide sites.
Interviewees provided collectively a long list of desirable attributes or capabilities that
EPA should insist that states have to be eligible for full responsibility for federal
Superfund sites. First, states should have adequate legal authority, including adequate
enforcement authority (e.g., strict, and joint and several liability, which one federal
official labeled as "key," but added is "blasphemy" in some state legislatures). One
state interviewee, when asked what hinders cleanups at state, non-NPL sites, similarly
identified the importance of adequate enforcement authorities, including strict, and joint
and several liability, stating: "Without strict, joint and several there can be problems
if a site has uncooperative PRPs." Second, states should also have adequate cost
recovery authority and ability. According to a recent GAO report, lack of adequate cost
recovery authority is a continuing weakness in the federal program as well. STATUS
OF PROGRESS, supra note 36, at 8. Third, states should have adequate contracting
authority and mechanisms. Several interviewees emphasized that a need exists to move
these sites and that states cannot be subject to significant delays due to procurement
problems. Like EPA, the states should have contractors on standby ready to respond.
Fourth, states should have adequate staffing, in terms of both numbers of staff and
competence. Fifth, states should provide adequate citizen participation procedures.
Sixth, states should demonstrate a commitment to comply with the NCP on remedy
selection and other issues. One interviewee disagreed with this attribute as a criterion,
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stating that "the idea of a relationship with States based on their learning how to do our
process is flawed. We have enough problems training our own staff." His advice was,
as to the "process part, forget it." Instead, he recommended a focus on "environmental
results." Seventh, states should establish a priority ranking system for addressing sites.
Finally,' states should have a track record of proven performance. As one state
interviewee put it, there needs to be demonstrated capability to clean up sites. From
a public relations perspective, the program is important enough and the amount of
money is large enough that a state must show it can do the job, not merely that it is set
up to do so. See infra note 123 and accompanying text (regarding steps EPA should
take to evaluate the track record of states interested in selecting remedies).
On the issue of determining state capability, in its 1989 evaluation of seven
state Superfund programs, GAO concluded that four features of state programs
contribute to "increased progress: [s]pecific state authority to clean up hazardous waste
sites[;] [s]trong enforcement tools to increase responsible-party actions, such as
authority to impose triple damages and priority liens[;] [s]tate Superfunds to address
sites without responsible-party funding[;] [and] [s]ufficient staff with suitable skills to
oversee cleanups." STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 29-30.
A fourth issue involves the factors the federal government should consider
before it takes over a site or a state program. One federal official stressed that EPA
needs to maintain sufficient staffing for this to be a realistic possibility. Another said
that there is "a need for an approach to allow withdrawal for a particular site or a
particular program, without the inadequacy rising to the nuclear problem level."
A fifth issue involves what federal authorities, if any, states should be able to
use in this role. Several state officials argued that they should have the full panoply
of federal authorities available to them. For example, CERCLA § 104 authorizes EPA
to spend federal Superfund money, to subpoena testimony, and to obtain access to sites
and documents. CERCLA § 104(a), (e), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a), (e) (1988). Section 106
empowers EPA to order PRPs to conduct necessary work at sites. CERCLA § 106, 42
U.S.C. § 9606. Section 106 also creates potential fines of up to $25,000 per day for
failure to comply with such an order. CERCLA § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1).
In addition, CERCLA § 107(c)(3) creates the sanction of treble damages for failing to
comply with such an order. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3). See, e.g.,
United States v. Parsons, 936 F.2d 526 (lth Cir. 1991); United States v. Carolina
Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992). Several federal officials who favored
dividing the universe of sites between EPA and the states opposed the delegation of
CERCLA enforcement authorities, independent of their position on other aspects of
delegation. Their reasoning, with which some state interviewees sympathized and
others disagreed, was that such a delegation would lead to inconsistent approaches to
enforcement and to the inappropriate inconsistent construction of CERCLA by various
states. One federal official said that one of his concerns with delegation "is that the
federal government would be on the sidelines while law is being made. Superfund
enforcement would never have succeeded without a strong body of case law.
Delegation would undermine this."
A sixth issue involves the appropriate nature and extent of state authority to
address federal Superfund sites using federal resources. Should EPA delegate only the
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At the outset, the federal government should be selective in
choosing the sites for which states will receive lead status, perhaps using
EPA Headquarters' traditional criteria for delegating responsibilities to
the regions. For example, EPA might retain sites of national
significance, sites for which the remedy will cost above a certain dollar
value, or sites that "involve complex area-wide contamination." ' 17
Some interviewees suggested that certain sites might be worth special
consideration for state lead early on. This category includes sites for
which "presumptive remedies" exist, that is, sites for which a certain type
of remedy is generally presumed to be appropriate. Caps for landfills are
an often-cited example. 8
Although the subject of state "capability" has already been
discussed,119 the issue of remedy selection, including the merits of a
change in EPA's policy to allow states to select remedies, deserves
special attention. Remedy selection is the component of the program
authority to require action like the RCRA corrective action delegation, or should
delegation include access to the federal Superfund as well? If the latter, how should
the money be allocated among states -- through block grants based on population, on
number of CERCLIS sites, on number of NPL sites, on a site-by-site basis, etc.?
Should states be able to keep money they recover; and what type of additional oversight
is required?
117. In his January 16, 1985 memo, Guidance on Delegation of Selection of Remedy
Authority to Regions, Jack W. McGraw, then Acting Administrator for EPA's Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response ("OSWER"), stated that EPA's initial target
goal was to delegate 60% of the federal FY 1985 RODs to the Regions. In his March
24, 1986 memo, Delegation of Remedy Selection to Regions, then Assistant
Administrator for OSWER J. Winston Porter noted that EPA's revised goal was that
90% of RODs be delegated to the Regions. Id. at 1. In his February 18, 1993 memo,
Twenty Fourth Remedy Delegation Report - FY 1993, Acting Assistant Administrator
for OSWER Richard J. Guimond stated that the purpose of his memo was to delegate
all RODs to the Regions, with Headquarters to retain a "consultation" role for RODs
under certain circumstances. For example, the Region must consult the Assistant
Administrator for OSWER if the remedy is anticipated to cost more than $60 million.
118. Several interviewees urged greater use of presumptive remedies for several types
of sites. Other interviewees cautioned that, while presumptive remedies sound good in
concept, a need would still exist for site-specific decisions. They further-cautioned that
presumptive remedies may cause newer technologies to take a back seat. For a
summary of the concept of using presumptive remedies to accelerate Superfind
cleanups, see EPA's SUPERFUND PROGRESS, supra note 49, at 9-10; see also EPA Seeks
Advice from Outsiders on Addressing Superfund Data Gaps, SUPERFUND REP., June 30,
1993, at 13; Browner, supra note 46, at 14.
119. See, e.g., supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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over which EPA traditionally has been most reluctant to cede control
because remedy selection plays a central role in the Superfund
program.
Much of the tension between EPA and the states reaches the
surface during the development of the ROD because the ROD resolves
the central issue in the federal Superfund program: What is the
appropriate remedy?
120
EPA has taken the policy positions that section 1211 of
CERCLA governs remedy selection, and that section 121(a) vests
responsibility for selecting remedies with EPA. 22  As a result, EPA
generally has allowed states to play only a subordinate role in the remedy
selection process with respect to NPL sites. 23 The federal government
120. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(0(5) (1992).
121. CERCLA § 121, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988); Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,242-43.
122. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
123. One exception exists to this general division of responsibility for remedy
selection. As one interviewee put it, EPA is "pilot testing the idea" of having states
take the lead at NPL sites: an idea which would include states selecting the remedy
without a need for EPA concurrence and ensure that the necessary cleanup action
occurs without federal involvement or funding.
The NCP contemplates such an approach. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(2)(i). The
NCP further contemplates that EPA and the states will enter into enforcement
agreements for such sites that "specify schedules and EPA involvement." Id §
300.505(d)(3). In an April 1991 guidance document, EPA stated that "[it] may take
back the lead from a State if the State does not comply with the EPA/State agreement."
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 103, at 3. To the best of the author's
knowledge, no such agreements have been consummated. See supra note 103.
One interviewee mentioned that EPA is moving on a parallel track toward
giving states a much greater role in overall remedy selection through developing the
national groundwater strategy. This interviewee said that under this strategy, states will
decide the extent of groundwater cleanup.
In practice, EPA regions and states have developed different approaches to this
issue of the states' role in the ROD process. At a minimum, under CERCLA, states
have an opportunity to review and comment on the proposed plan for remedial action
before EPA selects the final remedy. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(1) (discussing that
CERCLA expressly provides for "substantial and meaningful involvement by each state
[in] initiation, development, and selection of remedial actions"); see CERCLA §
121(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(0(1).
In contrast, when the region and the state agree, the state will develop the
proposed remedial action plan, draft the ROD, and provide it to EPA for comment. Id.
EPA must approve the proposed plan before it can be issued for public review and
comment. Id. EPA must also approve and adopt the remedy for a Fund-financed
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should change this policy to authorize states that it deems "capable" to
make these decisions.
EPA should collect and evaluate the considerable statistical
information it already possesses relating to whether a particular state is
qualified to select remedies. 24 For example, the NCP requires EPA
and the states to identify annually all of the sites for which RODs will
be prepared and to divide responsibility for preparing such RODs. 25
For "all EPA-lead sites, EPA shall prepare the ROD and provide the state
opportunity to concur with the recommended remedy," and for certain
mutually-agreed upon state-lead sites, "the state shall prepare the ROD
and seek EPA's concurrence and adoption of the remedy specified
therein. "12
6
In assessing the capability of each state interested in selecting
remedies, EPA should evaluate certain data in connection with sites for
which EPA selected the remedy. First, EPA should determine the
number of RODs with which the state refused to concur. 7 Second,
EPA should evaluate the significance of this number of disagreements,
given the total number of RODs that EPA has developed. Third, EPA
should determine the extent to which these disagreements are substantive
and not due to other factors, such as a state's inability to meet its cost
share obligations. Finally, EPA should examine whether particular
substantive issues are commonly the basis for these disagreements.'
response action to proceed. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(2)(ii). Even if a state takes an
active role in developing the remedy, EPA retains a "veto" for a Fund-lead project.
124. See supra note 85 (discussing the criterion of state's track record as one of
GAO's four suggested factors for evaluating state capability).
125. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(2)(i).
126. Id EPA prepares the RODs for the remaining fund-financed, state-lead sites. Id
127. If the federal government intends to implement a remedy with federal Superfund
monies, state concurrence is essential. CERCLA effectively provides states with an
absolute veto, giving them considerable leverage over EPA's choice of remedy. Under
CERCLA § 104(c)(3), before EPA can implement a Fund-financed remedial action, the
state must concur on the remedy and commit funding to 10% of the construction costs
of the remedy. CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(B) (1988). States
must make other commitments, including assuring any necessary adequate off-site
capacity, assuring acceptance of transfer of any property acquired by EPA necessary
to the cleanup, and accepting certain responsibilities for operation and maintenance.
CERCLA § 1040)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 96040)(2).
128. Several interviewees cited remedy selection as the most significant source of
tension between states and EPA. The anecdotal information they provided suggests that
EPA should obtain the empirical information described above to develop a better
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For example, some state interviewees complained that EPA remedies are
not sufficiently stringent, whereas other state officials claimed that EPA's
remedies are overly protective.
Similarly, for those RODs that states have prepared and
recommended to EPA, EPA should determine (1) the level of the state's
experience by how many RODs the state has developed; (2) how often
EPA and the state have agreed or disagreed; and (3) whether particular
types of disagreements arise frequently. In addition to these substantive
measures of capability, EPA should evaluate timeliness and other
procedural issues relating to capability.
EPA should also review other data in evaluating state capability
to select remedies. As noted above,' 29 EPA is "pilot testing" having
understanding of the source and nature of this tension.
For example, one federal official explained that EPA and the states often shift
sides on remedy depending on the site. He suggested that the specific substantive
cleanup standards are not the primary source of tension. Instead, he pointed to a need
to improve the system to minimize the possibility of such disagreements between the
two sovereigns.
In contrast, several other interviewees offered a different assessment of the
problem, stating that a pattern of disagreements on substance exists between EPA and
a number of states. As one federal Headquarters official stated, "[A]ggressive states
have a different vision of the program. ... This is the problem." A state official said
that, in contrast to EPA, "several states think they have an obligation to try to pump
and treat groundwater, even if it won't work." As one federal regional official
commented, "the states tend to not buy into the idea of obtaining protective remedies
at the maximum number of sites. They tend to want the most costly, permanent
remedy at each site."
EPA's 90-Day Study cites "lack of State concurrence with the remedy selection
as a major delay in moving sites toward remedial action." 90-DAY STUDY, supra note
30, at 3-10. The authors of the 90-Day Study continue:
In some cases, State resistance appears to be cost-related--States are
unwilling or unable to assume their share of the cost of the remedial
alternative selected or to commit themselves to financing lengthy 0
& M. In other cases, State resistance stems from differences with
EPA concerning feasible or appropriate levels of site cleanup.
Whatever the underlying cause, lack of State concurrence can cause
substantial delays in the remedial process, including the "shelving" of
RODs at Fund-lead sites and lengthy legal battles at enforcement-lead
sites.
Id.
129. See supra note 123 (discussing EPA's pilot testing of state lead at NPL sites).
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states select remedies at federal Superfund sites without the need for
EPA concurrence. EPA should determine the number of these sites and
evaluate the same data as to these sites.
Another feature of the current CERCLA structure provides a
fourth set of data that EPA should use in determining which states are
currently capable of selecting remedies. CERCLA gives states certain
rights if they disagree with EPA's remedy selection decision for sites for
which PRPs will implement the remedy. 3°  Such remedies are
embodied in consent decrees that CERCLA requires be lodged with and
then entered by a United States district court."'3 A state may challenge
a consent decree on the ground that it is unfair, unreasonable or
inconsistent with the Constitution or the mandate of Congress.' 32
Furthermore, if EPA has waived an applicable or* relevant and
appropriate requirement ("ARAR"), 33 a state may seek conformance
with the ARAR by opposing the entry of the consent decree
memorializing the PRP's commitment to implement EPA's ROD based
on the ROD's non-compliance with the ARAR. 134  If the state
130. See CERCLA § 121(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f). CERCLA authorizes EPA to issue
administrative orders or seek judicial orders, compelling responsible parties to conduct
hazardous waste cleanups, when "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or the environment" exists. Id. § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606. If
a state agrees with EPA's decision, it may join as a party to the consent decree that
memorializes the PRPs' obligation to implement the ROD. Id. § 121(f)(2)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)(A).
131. Id § 122(d)(1)(A), (g)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(l)(A), (g)(4).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Cannons, 720 F. Supp. 1027,. 1036 (D. Mass. 1989),
aft'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990).
133. Section 121 of CERCLA mandates that remedial actions comply with any
applicable or relevant and appropriate "standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation
under any Federal environmental law ...." CERCLA § 121(d)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. §
9621(d)(2)(A)(i). Congress adopted the concept of ARARs in the 1986 SARA
amendments, borrowing the concept from EPA's 1985 Superfind regulations. Starfield,
supra note 4, at 10,228, 10,230-31. ARARs represent an effort to avoid reinventing the
wheel on cleanup standards. In effect, CERCLA adopts standards from other
environmental statutes. For example, if EPA has decided under the Safe Drinking
Water Act that an acceptable concentration of benzene in drinking water is 5 parts per
billion ("ppb"), EPA will adopt 5 ppb as its cleanup standard for benzene in water that
is used or may be used as a drinking water source in selecting a remedy for a
Superfund site. For a brief background on ARARs, see id at 10,230-31.
CERCLA allows EPA to waive an ARAR in six instances. CERCLA §
121(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(4).
134. See CERCLA § 121(f)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f)(2)(B).
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establishes that EPA's waiver of the ARAR was indefensible, the court
may modify the remedial action to conform to the ARAR."3 ' States
have brought a number of judicial challenges to EPA-selected remedies
on this ground. 36
These decision points in the federal process for enforcement cases
provide the federal government with an opportunity to obtain a set of
empirical information by which the government may further evaluate
state capability to select remedies. For states with an interest in selecting
remedies at federal Superfund sites, EPA should develop the following
information. First, EPA should determine for how many RODs the state
has challenged a consent decree. Second, EPA should evaluate the
significance of this number of disagreements, given the total number of
RODs that EPA has developed in that state. Finally, EPA should
determine whether particular substantive issues commonly provide the
basis for these disagreements and, if so, what they are.
The interviewees' comments offered a preview of at least one
likely finding from the four sets of empirical information described
above. Several interviewees identified the issue of state ARARs as a
frequent source of conflict.'37 Consequently, EPA should focus on this
issue in developing its data.
State ARARs are duly promulgated state standards that are more
135. Id
136. See, e.g., United States v. Akzo Coatings, 949 F.2d 1409, 1448-49 (6th Cir.
1991).
137. Pursuant to SARA, CERCLA remedial actions "must comply with applicable or
relevant and appropriate requirements of state environmental and facility siting laws ...
where those requirements are promulgated, identified in a timely matter, and more
stringent than those under federal law." Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,236; see
CERCLA § 121(d)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii). This requirement has
caused problems because,
[s]ome states have provided mere "laundry lists" of state laws and/or
regulations, without specific discussions of how, if at all, they relate
to the site. This has resulted in delays and wasted resources. To
avoid this problem in the future, the preamble to the final NCP directs
states to provide "a list of requirements with specific citations to the
section of law identified as a potential ARAR, and a brief explanation
of why that requirement is considered to be applicable or relevant
and appropriate to the site."
Starfield, supra note 4, at 10,236 (emphasis in original) (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. 8746
(1990)).
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stringent than the federal standards. 38  A number of federal
interviewees strongly criticized CERCLA's current treatment of state
ARARs. One commonly voiced complaint was that states do not apply
their own ARARs consistently. One federal interviewee, capturing this
sentiment, stated that "it's easy for states to demand that EPA meet the
ARARs, but they don't do it themselves at their state sites." In contrast,
state interviewees complained that EPA ignores state ARARs.
Based upon the interviews, one answer to this issue may lie in
"following the money." 139  Currently, CERCLA requires EPA to meet
state requirements that are more stringent than federal requirements. 40
For Fund-lead sites, CERCLA authorizes the use of federal funds to pay
for the extra cleanup needed to meet these requirements.'4 '
Several interviewees objected to the current approach from a
policy perspective. First, they said that the approach inappropriately
separates the responsibility to develop more stringent requirements from
the responsibility to pay for them. Second, they indicated that this
approach differs from the approach followed in most programs, in which
the federal government provides the "base" and a state that wants
additional protection must pay for it.'42 Third, they claimed that this
138. Section 121 of CERCLA requires remedial actions to conform to any applicable
or relevant and appropriate "State environmental or facility siting law that is more
stringent than any Federal standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation ...." CERCLA
§ 121(d)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii). For example, -if EPA has established
a limit of 10 ppb for benzene in drinking water and Oklahoma has established a limit
of 5 ppb, Oklahoma's standard meets the stringency requirement of an ARAR. Cf
supra note 133 (discussing federal ARARs).
139. This phrase has a long history in a variety of contexts, including the
environmental arena. See e.g., Marlise Simons, West Offers Plan to Clean Up East,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at A13.
140. CERCLA § 121(d)(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii) (1988).
141. Id. Alternatively, CERCLA allows EPA to waive an ARAR where the cost of
attaining the ARAR is not commensurate with the additional protection to human health
and the environment. Id. § 121(d)(4)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(4)(F).
142. In instances where the final remedy selection does not incorporate the state
ARAR, either by waiver, late identification or some other reason, the state may fund
the additional cost for its attainment, provided the ARAR is not inconsistent with the
EPA-selected remedy. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(f)(I)(ii) (1992); see also Starfield, supra
note 4, at 10,243 (discussing remedy enhancement); Babich, supra note 3, at 10,009("[i]n the past, when faced with the need to deal with thousands of pollution sources,
EPA has implemented regulatory programs through a system called 'cooperative
federalism.' Under this system, EPA establishes federal standards to create a floor
beneath which environmental quality must not drop.") (citations omitted); Belsky, supra
1993]
54 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 18:01
approach is unfair because it, in effect, requires the federal taxpayer in
one state to subsidize the taxpayer in another. For example, why should
State Y and other states subsidize State X's judgment that the federal
standard is inadequate if (1) EPA concludes that ten parts per million
("ppm") cadmium in the soil is safe; (2) State X promulgates one ppm
as an ARAR for cadmium; (3) the cost of cleaning up to ten ppm is $1
million; and (4) the cost of cleaning up to one ppm is $10 million?'
143
Several interviewees said that the conflicts between EPA and the states
regarding state ARARs would diminish if Congress changed CERCLA
to allocate to states the extra cost of cleanup required to meet state
ARARs.
As part of its data collection effort to determine state capability
to select remedies, EPA should develop information on the role of state
ARARs in the remedy selection process and on the extent to which state
ARARs have been the cause of disagreements between EPA and states.
First, EPA should determine how often state ARARs control remedy
selection, and at how many sites state ARARs have been the basis for
selecting a remedy. Second, EPA should find out which specific state
ARARs have provided the basis for an EPA-selected remedy. Third,
EPA should gather information as to how often EPA has waived a state
ARAR. Several federal officials indicated that EPA rarely, if ever,
invokes its authority under CERCLA to waive state ARARs. EPA
should decide whether this observation is true, and if it is, why this is the
note 3, at 29 ("states ... were encouraged to build on the minimum federal requirements
by adopting and applying more stringent rules. The 1977 Amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act and the Clean Air Act made it explicit that states could
establish controls that were more restrictive than federal requirements").
143. The interviewee who suggested this hypothetical indicated that 
the
inappropriateness of such a subsidy is even more clear if State Y has determined that
the appropriate standard for cadmium is 10 ppm or higher.
The Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response has recommended that
remedies be standardized by either site category or soil cleanup standards. The office
has estimated that such an effort would take three to six years to complete. PROBLEMS
WITH SITE CLEANUP PLANS, supra note 38, at 45.
A fourth related concern is that EPA funding of state ARAR implementation
creates a greater likelihood of inconsistencies across states. For example, the capping
of a particular site is permissible in one state, but a similar site in another state cannot
be capped.
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case.' 44 Finally, EPA should determine to what extent states apply
their own ARARs consistently; which state ARARs are commonly
invoked by states; and to what extent these states apply these ARARs
themselves at state sites.
By developing this information, EPA will advance the debate on
the causes and frequency of EPA/state disagreements on remedy selection
issues and thereby advance its effort to evaluate state capability. This
information will also help EPA's effort to develop strategies that will
minimize these disagreements for sites where EPA will continue to select
the remedy.
The final step EPA should take to evaluate capability pertains to
states that are interested in making remedy selection decisions at federal
Superfund sites, but have an inadequate track record in the federal
program. To determine capability in such cases, EPA should review
state performance in selecting remedies in the state Superfund program,
as well as the state's RCRA delegation status and its performance in
overseeing corrective action and closure under RCRA.
2. Dividing Functions
In a somewhat less extreme break from the current paradigm, the
federal government should look for opportunities to allocate
responsibilities to states that may not be ready to accept full
responsibility for sites. Instead of dividing responsibilities ,with states by
dividing up sites, EPA would divide responsibilities according to
function. Based on the interviews, EPA divides functions reasonably
effectively in the Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection ("PA/SI")
context, involving the preliminary studies conducted at sites. 4
The interviewees indicated that many states participate actively in
the PA/SI process. 4  According to one interviewee, a state can
arrange the following role. First, the state will conduct most of the
PA/SIs with EPA funding. Second, the state and EPA will utilize multi-
144. EPA's practice of refusing to incorporate a state-asserted ARAR without formally
waiving the requirement raises another issue. EPA follows this practice when it
believes that the state requirement is not an ARAR. Statistics concerning the number
of times EPA has taken this position would be valuable but probably difficult to obtain.
145. See supra note 101 (discussing the role of PA/SIs in the Superfund process).
146. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing states' performance of
over 60% of the PAs, and over 30% of the Sis); see also TEN YEARS OF PROGRESS,
supra note 46, at 31.
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site funding agreements to reduce bureaucratic paperwork. One state
interviewee indicated, for example, that the state had recently signed an
agreement with the EPA region that covered funding for the state's
performance of PA/SIs at thirty sites.'47 Third, to minimize duplication
of effort and possible conflict, EPA will agree to notify the state before
EPA decides to perform a PA/SI itself. In addition to states' work under
the federal program, states conduct a great deal of work at non-federal
sites. Advance notification by the federal government will help to
minimize duplication of effort. Based on the interviews, this process
seems to work well from a EPA/state perspective. States conduct a
considerable amount of the work. The federal government should seek
to increase the percentage of PA/SI work that states conduct and should
seek to expand state hands-on responsibility beyond this stage.'48
3. An Improved "Dual Role" Framework
Even after improving the federal/state relationship by creating a
new bias toward dividing rather than sharing sites and establishing a
better defined functional division of responsibilities, the federal
government needs to improve its approach by addressing a third set of
sites: sites that are important state and federal priorities and at which
both the state and federal governments want to be actively involved
throughout the Superfund process.
The federal government needs to work with states to develop
mutually acceptable ground rules for jointly handling such sites. Such
ground rules currently do not exist. Interviewees from one region
discussed in detail the extensive experience they have had in negotiating
three-party consent decrees -- settlements involving the United States, the
state and the PRPs. Certain issues are endemic to this negotiation
process. According to the interviewees, these issues have both a
substantive dimension and an "attitudinal" component. Regarding the
latter, one federal official articulated: "The federal government has
created a highly structured, very resource intensive process. It wants to
147. See 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note 5, at 75 (reporting that 38 states
have entered into multi-state cooperative agreements with EPA).
148. See supra note 101 (noting that states do far fewer RI/FSs). As part of this effort
to increase state responsibility, EPA should evaluate state capability to conduct
increasing numbers of PA/SIs and RI/FSs. See supra Section lI.D.! (discussing the
types of information EPA would need to evaluate such capability). EPA also should
evaluate the level of its oversight of such work and reduce it whenever possible.
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win all the issues with everyone. And it presents issues [to states] on a
take it or leave it basis: 'We'd like to have a partnership. The terms of
the partnership are ..... '" A state official participating in this effort said
along the same lines: "There needs to be a true model consent decree that
EPA and the states agree to, but we would need give and take on this,
and EPA is not used to giving."
The above-referenced EPA region and the states within that region
are attempting to develop such guidelines, rather than continually
"relitigating" the same issues concerning their relationship on an ad hoc,
site-by-site basis. First, the interviewees believed that negotiating the
terms of three-party consent decrees anew on a site-by-site basis did not
make sense. Instead, the federal and state governments should develop
a model consent decree with which both would be comfortable. Second,
if the federal government is willing to acknowledge the reality of state
sovereignty, the federal and state governments should be. able to narrow
the differences that currently exist. For example, as several interviewees
from both the state and federal governments noted, the United States
should not insist that a state give up its right to seek to reopen a consent
decree if the state later determines that the remedy is not protective. 149
The interviewees who are involved in this effort were cautiously
optimistic about its potential for improving relations between the
governments in the enforcement arena. The federal government needs
to support this effort and encourage the development of ground rules that
will establish a solid foundation for federal/state coordination at sites
where both governments choose to be actively involved.
Achieving up front a mutually acceptable understanding of the
respective roles of the federal and state governments, together with the
change in attitude discussed above, will improve the federal/state
149. According to the interviewees, part of the problem is that the governments have
different views of states' rights. States view themselves as sovereigns with a
responsibility to safeguard their environment and citizens. EPA views itself as the
ultimate arbiter of what is safe and what is unsafe.
States and regions have utilized different approaches to'address this reality.
First, as suggested in the text, some states and regions have continued to negotiate
three-party consent decrees to which EPA, the state and PRPs are parties. Second,
some states have essentially dropped out of the federal enforcement process as much
as possible. In some cases, these states have chosen to focus on non-NPL sites. Other
states have dropped out because they consider the federal demands that the states cede
their sovereignty as a condition to being a party to a settlement unreasonable. Finally,
a minority approach utilized by a few states and regions allows states to take the
enforcement lead at federal NPL sites, with EPA playing a background role.
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relationship at sites where both governments feel a need for active
involvement.
4. Streamlining the Federal/State Relationship by Streamlining the
Federal Bureaucracy
In addition to taking a variety of steps to streamline the
federal/state relationship, the federal government should streamline its
own handling of Superfund sites. Several interviewees recommended
eliminating, or dramatically curtailing, the role of the United States
Department of Justice ("DOJ") in the Superfund settlement process.
CERCLA authorizes DOJ to approve settlements by requiring that
remedial settlements be lodged and then entered in federal court. 5 '
EPA must refer a site to DOJ for lodging in court and DOJ may refuse
to lodge the settlement or may delay its lodging if DOJ disagrees with
the terms of the- settlement. 151 One interviewee suggested that
presumably Congress provided a role for DOJ in the settlement process
due to congressional paranoia lingering from the early Superfund era.
This interviewee continued by saying that the process simply cannot
withstand the consequences of this paranoia any longer.5 2  Another
interviewee said that DOJ should litigate cases, not settle them. The
consensus of the interviewees was that one federal bureaucracy, or two
bureaucracies if EPA Headquarters is involved, should be capable of
negotiating settlements and that attenuating authority creates
inefficiencies and duplication of effort that the federal government cannot
afford and should eliminate. 3
150. CERCLA § 122(d)(l)(A), (g)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A), (g)(4) (1988).
151. Id. § 122(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2)(B). In addition to its role in judicial
settlements, DOJ has a role in Superfund administrative settlements. CERCLA §
122(g)(4) provides that when an administrative order memorializes a settlement, the
Attorney General must approve the order in advance if the total response costs exceed
$500,000. Id. § 122(g)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(4).
152. For a critical summary of the agency's performance during the early Superfund
years, see Chapter 1 Environmental Protection Under Reagan: What Went Wrong,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS 19 (1986).
153. Only one interviewee expressed support for a DOJ role. This interviewee noted
that the CERCLA requirement that remedial settlements be lodged and then entered in
court provides a forum for states to challenge the remedy if they disagree with it. See
CERCLA §§ 113, 121, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613, 9621; see also United States v. Town of
Moreau, 751 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). Because this interviewee still opposes
a DOJ sign-off, he emphasized that Congress should develop a better mechanism for
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E. Finding Five. The federal government should eliminate existing
financial incentives toward conflict.
Ironically, the current structure of the federal Superfund
program's cost share provisions results in a bias toward conflict between
the federal and state governments by creating conflicting financial
incentives for the two governments. The federal government should
eliminate this systemic bias toward conflict.
The most significant costs associated with Superfund sites are (1)
the cost of constructing and implementing the remedy and (2) the cost
of operating and maintaining the remedy.'54 According to EPA's
interpretation, CERCLA allocates to states ten percent of the construction
costs and one hundred percent of the operation and maintenance ("0 &
M") costs."' EPA bears the remaining costs: ninety percent of the
states to challenge settlements with which they disagree.
The author does not recommend divesting the federal courts of their authority
to review settlements for fairness and legal defensibility. The opportunity for judicial
review of EPA-approved settlements remains essential for states, as well as non-settlors
and members of the public. Congress should restructure CERCLA to eliminate or limit
DOJ's role without eliminating the role of the federal courts in ensuring the fairness
and legal defensibility of such settlements. An option that Congress might consider is
to allow EPA to represent itself in court in connection with such settlements, perhaps
by designating EPA attorneys as Assistant United States Attorneys for this purpose.
Such an approach would require legislative change. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988)
(reserving representation of the federal government solely to the Department of Justice).
154. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.500 (1992). For example, building a landfill would be part
of the construction phase of the remedial process. Once the landfill is constructed and
being used as a disposal facility, the costs of operating and maintaining that landfill,
such as the cost of cutting the grass on the top of the landfill, would be part of the 0
& M phase.
155. Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1543-46 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding EPA's
interpretation of CERCLA on this issue). In the states' amended joint opening brief,
the states spent approximately 90 pages out of a total of 199 pages challenging the
NCP's construction of CERCLA on a variety of state role issues. See Petitioner's
Amended Joint Opening Brief, Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 86-
1096).
CERCLA requires states to assume "10 per centum of the costs of the remedial
action, including all future maintenance." CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. §
9604(c)(3)(C)(i) (1988). EPA has interpreted this provision to mean 100% of 0 & M
costs, 55 Fed. Reg. 8736, 8740 (1990). Several states have suggested that EPA's
reading is at odds with CERCLA § 104(c)(7), which designates the source of funds for
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construction costs and zero percent of the O & M costs.
Because of the disparity in state cost share, states have a strong
financial incentive to favor a remedy that is construction intensive and
involves minimal 0 & M. Because EPA's cost share is ninety percent
for construction costs and zero percent for 0 & M, EPA's financial
incentives are in direct conflict with the states' incentives and drive EPA
to select a remedy that is light on construction costs and 0 & M
intensive.
Before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
resolved this disagreement, 56 even federal officials conceded that if
they should prevail with their interpretation of CERCLA on this issue,
the question of who pays for 0 & M should be revisited. One federal
official said that the differential cost share "increases the likelihood of
government being at loggerheads. [The federal and state governments]
have different interests. The difference in cost share for capital costs and
O & M gets in the way of making good public policy decisions."
Another federal official said that he did not think that Congress
"anticipated the strain on the system by creating an incentive for states
to front-load cleanups by heavy capital costs and creating opposite
incentives for the federal government." A state official agreed that a
differential cost share creates "a built-in incentive for conflict." Another
state official pointed out that this conflict arises because the cost share
is "not a minor differential."
Furthermore, many interviewees, particularly state officials, voiced
their opinion that this built-in incentive for conflict has become a reality
at many sites and drives EPA to favor remedies with low construction
and high 0 & M costs.' An EPA regional official countered with the
federal perspective that states have also allowed the disparity to influence
"the Federal share of the payment of the cost of operation and maintenance pursuant
to (3)(C)(i)." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(7). These states take the position that CERCLA
creates a 90%(federal)/10%(state) cost share for 0 & M, the same ratio CERCLA
establishes for construction costs. See Petitioner's Amended Joint Opening Brief, at
120-31, Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 86-1096). Nine states
joined this brief: Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Colorado, California, New Jersey, New
York, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Ohio. On some issues, these states do not agree
among themselves. /ld at 1.
156. See supra note 155.
157. Some federal officials conceded that the differential cost share creates a financial
incentive for conflict but said that they have never seen data to support the existence
of such conflict.
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their judgment, stating that "if the state knows it will have to pick up the
O & M, then the state tends to push for extras in the remedial process."
A number of interviewees said that they are seeing an increasing
number of cashouts.'5 8 Because of their differing financial interests,
the federal/state relationship is suffering unnecessarily in this context.
One federal official said that "very contentious debates [have occurred]
regarding what amount of the proceeds go [sic] towards construction and
what percentage goes to 0 & M." Along the same lines, a state official
stated: "The PRP cashout issue is a problem. ... [My state] doesn't
always have the same interests as U.S. E.P.A. For example, [my state]
does not benefit by early cashouts of PRPs [for construction costs]."
In addition to these conflicts, interviewees said that the disparity
in cost share for construction and 0 & M costs frequently leads to
disputes regarding where government should draw the line between the
definitions of 0 & M and construction. Interviewees explained that, as
expected given the different financial incentives, EPA has adopted the
position that under CERCLA, relatively more activities should be
characterized as 0 & M rather than construction, and states have taken
the opposite tack.'59
Finally, state interviewees opined that EPA's interpretation of its
cost share responsibilities causes EPA systematically to treat 0 & M
lightly in the remedial selection process. One interviewee characterized
this treatment by saying that "0 & M is 'dumped' on the state. EPA is
not very concerned with 0 & M in remedy selection.0 60
Having a financial structure that creates a different cost share for
different parts of the process appears to be a major source of tension
between EPA and the states. Differential cost shares have the potential
to drive the federal and state governments in opposite directions on
remedy issues due to their potentially conflicting financial interests.
158. "Cashouts" are settlements in which PRPs pay money to the government rather
than commit to conduct work at sites.
159. The litigation also involved the issue of when a response becomes "operational,"
with the court noting that "[g]iven that states are responsible for 100% of operations
and maintenance (0 & M) costs, the determination of the point at which a response
becomes 'operational' is an extremely important aspect of the cost sharing issue." Ohio
v. EPA, 997 F.2d at 1546.
160. One federal official conceded the state interviewees' basic point that EPA treats
0 & M lightly, but said that this problem is not driven by who pays for 0 & M. He
suggested that government should develop better cost estimates and expressed his belief
that estimates will improve over time.
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Levelling out the cost shares, so that both EPA and state shares are even
throughout the process, would eliminate a potentially significant financial
incentive for conflict that is inherent in the existing system. As one
interviewee said, "If there were the same cost share you would get rid of
a lot of the problems [between EPA and the states]. ' "'6  An EPA
interviewee stated more generally, "Anything you can do to make EPA
161. A separate issue is what the level cost share should be for each government. The
cleanest option is to make the federal government bear 100% of the cost for the sites
where it has the lead and have states do the same for state-lead sites. This approach
is probably most consistent with the objective of maximizing efficiency by dividing
sites, instead of "double teaming" them. See supra Section II.D.I.
A second option is to increase the states' share of construction costs to
compensate for reducing their share of 0 & M. Some interviewees, who believe that
states who want an equal or close to equal role should pay an equal amount, agree with
this option. Several interviewees said that the limited state share fosters an unrealistic
state approach to federal money -- states operate as if they are playing with "free
money" and therefore they want to spend it all. These interviewees recommended a
state share that is high enough to make states financially accountable as a condition for
states' ability to influence remedy selection. They were confident that with such a
shift, the dynamic would change dramatically, and states would not push for expensive
remedies. Even these interviewees recognized, however, that creating a higher cost
share would exacerbate the inability of several states to meet their share.
One EPA interviewee voiced the concern that EPA could not afford to bear a
portion of 0 & M costs. Based on the interviews and other information, states are also
unable to bear these costs. Several interviewees reported that some states currently are
not meeting their 0 & M commitments, and that several states similarly are unable to
meet their 10% cost share obligation. In his statement to the Environment, Energy, and
Natural Resources Subcommittee summarizing OTA's report Coming Clean, Dr. Joel
S. Hirschhorn, then Senior Associate at OTA, said that "cleanups for sites within the
Superfund program are often less stringent and less costly because of states' efforts to
minimize or eliminate their 10 percent matching funds." Government Operations
Hearing, supra note 42, at 76 (prepared statement of Dr. Hoe] S. Hirschhorn, Senior
Associate, Office of Technology Assessment). EPA's 50-State Study similarly casts
doubt on the adequacy of states' financial resources, reporting, with several
qualifications as to the accuracy of its financial information, that 13 states have less
than $1 million, and 14 states have from $1 million up to $5 million. 50-STATE
STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note 5, at 21, 22.
As this discussion suggests, although level state and federal cost shares for
both construction and 0 & M costs throughout the remedial process make sense, pros
and cons exist for any particular percentage each government must contribute. The
appropriate level of cost share is an issue that deserves separate consideration and
warrants developing additional information.
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and the states feel they have the same stake is a good idea."'62
162. Another aspect of the 0 & M issue that some interviewees raised involves what
happens, and what should happen, if a state fails to meet its 0 & M commitment.
Under CERCLA, a state's failure to pay its share of the cleanup costs means, at least
potentially, that EPA will assign lower priority to other sites in that state. See
CERCLA § 105(A)(8)(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (1988) ("State preparedness to
assume State costs and responsibilities" is a factor in determining response priorities
among NPL sites).
The issue of whether states are meeting their 0 & M obligations deserves more
systematic inquiry. As construction is completed at increasing numbers of sites, the
issue of 0 & M and how its implementation problems should be handled will assume
increasing significance.
A final issue relating to the problem of differential cost shares concerns post-
ROD issues regarding changing the remedy and the design. CERCLA provides two
alternative mechanisms for EPA to use when it alters a remedy after the ROD is signed.
First, if the remedy will be "significantly different," EPA must issue an Explanation of
Significant Differences ("ESD"). 40 C.F.R. § 300.435(c)(2)(i) (1992). A "significant
difference" is one that may alter the scope or the cost of the remedy, but does not recast
the basic remedial approach. See id.
One state official said that this procedure has been a source of considerable
concern for several states. He explained that by its terms, the altered remedy is
significantly different from the remedy selected in the ROD. This difference creates
problems because it limits states' rights to participate in the process of selecting this
significantly different remedy. The implications are such that for fund-lead sites, if a
state has concurred in a ROD and made the requisite funding and other commitments,
and EPA later issues an ESD, the state remains bound to fulfill its commitments in
terms of this new remedy. This obligation exists even though the ESD could
potentially, for example, significantly alter the nature of the remedy and the extent of
the state's financial contribution. For example, an ESD might reduce the construction
associated with a particular remedy and increase the anticipated 0 & M, resulting in
significant financial detriment to a state; yet, according to a state official interviewee,
a state would be hard pressed to revoke its earlier commitment which it made based on
the original ROD. A federal official downplayed this state concern, indicating that
changes in the remedy can be dealt with in the drafting of the state Superfund contract.
As a matter of fairness and in the interest of "team building," the federal government
seriously should consider affording states the same right to participate in EPA's
selection of significantly different remedies as the right they possess in the remedy
selection process.
Second, the "design phase" follows issuance of the ROD. See 40 C.F.R. §
300.435(b). Two interviewees, one state official and one federal official, indicated that
similar to the ESD situation, the design process can result in significant cost changes.
These changes leave no recourse to states which have already made commitments
regarding their 10% share of construction costs and 100% share of 0 & M costs. The
state official reported several situations in which engineering work during the design
phase shifted costs from the construction of the remedy to its 0 & M, thereby
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F. Finding Six: A need exists to improve the "team concept" and
foster mutual respect.
Interviewees stressed that a major area that needs improvement
involves the attitudes of the government officials toward each other.
Several interviewees cited a need to improve the attitudes of the federal
and state players so that they will begin to act as though they are
partners on a team instead of adversaries. One official said that "states
act like oppressed people" and that "people [from the federal and state
governments] feel like they're adversaries, not working together."
This issue permeates many of the problems in the federal/state
relationship discussed in this Article. Taking the steps outlined above
would help to dissipate some of this tension. For example, changing the
structure of the federal program to eliminate financial incentives for
conflict would improve the relationship between the two levels of
government. 63
Similarly, as one federal official articulated, "No one likes to be
in a subordinate position." Developing a more horizontal type of
relationship, in which states are encouraged to take full responsibility for
sites, would build a sense of equality rather than a sense of subordination
and superiority. This approach would be better than the current, more
vertical relationship which is characterized by EPA looking over the
states' shoulders when states take action at sites, and by states' reviewing
and commenting when EPA has the lead. This approach also would help
to shift attitudes like that of one interviewee, who said, "It is difficult to
keep the state managers within their state role. The state role is
reviewing and commenting."
increasing the state's financial obligation. Both officials noted the possibility that this
opportunity for the federal government to change the remedy unilaterally, with no state
input, creates at least the potential for accusations of bad faith by state officials,
especially given the disparity in cost share for the construction and 0 & M phases. By
revising the cost share structure, the federal government will help ensure that
unanticipated developments during the design do not cause unnecessary friction or ill
will between the federal and state governments.
163. See supra Section Hl.E. A related issue is that if the federal government maintains
a state cost share, it should allow state participation in the ESD process and in
authorizing significant changes to the design. See supra note 162.
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Finally, as noted above,'" some federal officials criticized the
states for being irresponsible in the remedy selection process.
Revamping CERCLA's provisions regarding state ARARs, by making
federal standards the floor and allowing states to require enhancements
if they will pay for them or are able to convince or require PRPs to do
so, would contribute to reducing the significance of this issue.'65
G. Finding Seven: The federal government should take several other
actions to improve the federal/state partnership.
1. The federal government should change the law on state cost share
at municipal sites.
The federal government should change the fifty percent state cost
share for Superfund municipal sites.'66 One state official said that
"neither the state nor the municipality can give matching dollars at
Superfund municipal sites." A federal official made the same point,
stating that no good rationale exists for establishing a unique cost share
for these sites and that such a unique cost share "distorts the process,"
especially if the state had little, if anything, to do with the creation of the
164. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of states
"playing with free money," that is, urging remedies without fmding a way to pay for
them).
165. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
166. See CERCLA § 104(c)(3)(C)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(C)(ii) (1988). This
section states:
The President shall not provide any remedial actions pursuant to this
section unless the State in which the release occurs first enters into a
contract or cooperative agreement with the President providing
assurances deemed adequate by the President that ... the State will pay
or assure payment of ... 50 percent ... of any sums expended in
response to a release at a facility, that was operated by the State or a
political subdivision thereof, either directly or through a contractual
relationship or otherwise, at the time of any disposal of hazardous
substances therein.
Id This section covers sites "operated by a State or political subdivision thereof' and
therefore covers more than merely "municipal sites." Id The state cost share for such
sites currently is a minimum of 50%. Id This figure contrasts with the state's 10%
cost share for other Fund-lead federal NPL sites. Id. § 104(c)(3)(C)(i), 42 U.S.C. §
9604(c)(3)(C)(i).
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site.
2. The federal government needs to improve communication of
information.
EPA Headquarters needs to change fundamentally its method of
communicating with the EPA regions and the states. Currently, and
traditionally, EPA Headquarters issues guidance documents to provide
policy direction.'67  The adequacy of this EPA guidance received
considerable attention during the interviews. One interviewee expressed
the very strong consensus that such EPA guidance is of limited value,
stating that "guidance gets very short shrift in our region. '68 Former
EPA General Counsel Donald Elliott similarly challenged the usefulness
of EPA guidance:
James Landis, the father of American administrative law,
once wrote that developing simple, "effective routines" is
the key to good administration. Unfortunately, however,
for all its volume and complexity, our enormous and
unwieldy body of law and administrative practice under
Superfund fails to provide clear guidance that can be
administered efficiently and predictably. 69
EPA needs to take a hard look at its use of guidance documents
as a mechanism for communicating between Headquarters and regions,
and in the context of federal/state relations. EPA should explore ways
to refine the guidance system. 7 ' In addition, as one interviewee
suggested, EPA should consider providing more training as a method to
improve communication.
167. As of 1989, more than 200 such documents existed for the federal Superfund
program alone. 90-DAY STUDY, supra note 30, at 3-27.
168. See COMING CLEAN supra note 38, at 14 (OTA noting the "young, inexperienced"
nature of the government workforce, and recommending that Superfund's managers
provide this workforce "with better information and technical assistance, more explicit
policies, and closer supervision").
169. Elliott, supra note 47, at 12.
170. See 90-DAY STUDY, supra note 30, at 3-27 (finding that "[e]xisting ... guidance
... is generally too long and detailed for its intended purpose and is often not easily
accessible").
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3. The federal government needs to convince the states they can
trust EPA concerning federal facilities.
Several state officials noted that one source of tension between
EPA and the states stems from EPA's "not having its own federal house
in order." They said that EPA does not require much of federal
facilities,' 7 ' and these low standards create general distrust. The state
perspective is that, in order to protect the United States Department of
Defense and the United States Department of Energy, EPA is reluctant
to honor state standards. The states view EPA as reluctant to enforce
agreements with federal facilities. EPA needs to convince the states that
it is being effective and consistent in its dealings with other federal
agencies.1
4. The federal government needs to change its approach if it wants
states to participate as intended in ensuring a comprehensive
inventory of potential sites.
The CERCLA Information System ("CERCLIS") is EPA's
database for potential hazardous waste sites.77 EPA designed the
database to be a comprehensive list of contaminated sites potentially in
171. CERCLA actions at federal facilities are covered by CERCLA § 120, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620 (1988). Section 120 delegates the majority of the CERCLA process to the
agency or department owning or operating the facility, including the RI/FS and the
cleanup. CERCLA § 120(eX)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e)(l)-(2).
172. Evaluating the merits of state complaints in this area is beyond the scope of this
Article. Four aspects of this issue, however, warrant mention. First, according to a
report in an environmental newsletter, an upcoming United States General Accounting
Office report is critical of the slow pace at which EPA is evaluating federal facilities.
Upcoming Report Says EPA Failed to Inspect Hundreds of Contaminated Sites,
SUPERFUND REP.', Mar. 10, 1993, at 14. Currently, there are 1900 federal sites awaiting
investigation. Id Second, for those federal facilities that are on the NCP, EPA needs
to negotiate enforceable agreements obligating the relevant federal agency to conduct
a comprehensive and timely investigation and cleanup. Third, EPA needs to monitor
compliance with such agreements closely and pursue enforcement (through collection
of stipulated penalties and otherwise, when significant non-compliance occurs). Finally,
EPA needs to ensure that interested states are able to play an integral role in (1)
negotiating such agreements and (2) monitoring for and pursuing non-compliance.
173. See generally OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 9345.1-09-0, SUPERFUND NPL CHARACERItzATION
PROJECT: NATIONAL RESULTS (Nov. 1991) (describing CERCLIS and the other
components of EPA's site assessment program).
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need of cleanup. EPA investigates contaminated or potentially
contaminated areas listed on CERCLIS to determine whether it should
devote further attention to the site under Superfund 74 CERCLIS
currently includes more than 36,000 sites.'
The state role in connection with CERCLIS is fairly
straightforward. States have the opportunity to nominate sites for listing
on CERCLIS to their EPA region.176
Several EPA and state officials reported that states do not
nominate all potential sites for inclusion on CERCLIS, primarily because
once a site is on CERCLIS the site is "stigmatized."'" In its 1989
report, GAO found that twenty-six percent of the non-NPL sites that
states had identified were not listed on CERCLIS."7 ' Officials from
one state said that they did not nominate a single site during the past
-year. An official from another state said that many states maintain two
lists -- one for sites that they report to EPA and another "unofficial" list
of sites that they do not report for inclusion on CERCLIS. Interviewees
indicated that among other disadvantages, banks are extremely wary of
lending money on property listed on CERCLIS.
Despite its having a total of more than 36,000 sites, CERCLIS is
not fulfilling its intended function of serving as a comprehensive list of
potential hazardous substance sites that require remediation. States are
responsible for this divorce between goal and reality because of their
deliberate selectivity in nominating sites for inclusion on the CERCLIS
data base. CERCLIS, therefore, should not necessarily be considered a
proxy for the actual scope of the potential hazardous waste site problem
in the United States.
The federal government has tried to resolve the stigma issue but
has not succeeded. As noted previously, governments commonly
174. OTA calculated that a cumulative rate of nine percent of CERCLIS sites made
the NPL between 1983 and 1988. COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 127.
175. See ENVIRONMENTAL FACT SHEET, supra note 49 (noting that CERCLIS
contained 36,814 potential sites as of January 1993).
176. EPA obtains recommendations for listing sites on CERCLIS from other sources
as well. See CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1988) (requiring facilities to
notify EPA of any non-permitted releases of hazardous substances); see also id §
105(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (allowing citizens to petition EPA to investigate a
suspected release or threatened release of a hazardous substance).
177. See COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 99 (finding that states do not report all
potential sites to EPA for a variety of reasons).
178. STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 21.
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acknowledge that a perceived stigma is associated with CERCLIS listing.
This stigma influences states' behavior. 79 Consequently, if the
objective is for states to help make CERCLIS comprehensive, the federalI.
government needs to take further action to reduce the stigma associated
with CERCLIS listing.
III. ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR THE FEDERAL/STATE
RELATIONSHIP
The existing framework for federal/state relations in the hazardous
waste site arena contains three key elements. First, the federal Superfund
program focuses on a relatively small subset of the total number of
hazardous waste sites throughout the country that need cleanup
action.' ° Second, the federal government plays the dominant role in
addressing these sites, with states playing a more or less active
subordinate role.' Third, states bear the primary responsibility for
addressing the other sites that need attention."8 2
Findings Two through Seven contain recommendations for
improving the federal/state relationship within this framework ("Status
179. A concern over stigma associated with CERCLIS listing appears to have been
raised during the development of the 1990 NCP. Based on the preamble to the NCP,
EPA's position seems to be that it has taken adequate steps to reduce any stigma
associated with CERCLIS listing by (1) creating a special designation, the No Further
Response Action Planned designation, for sites that EPA has investigated and
determined do not warrant further action, and (2) stating explicitly in the regulation that
"[i]nclusion of a specific site or area in the CERCLIS database does not represent a
determination of any party's liability, nor does it represent a finding that any response
action is necessary." 55 Fed. Reg. 8692 (1990). Placement on state Superfund lists
probably carries a stigma as well. The anecdotal information from the interviews is
that "making the federal program" creates an additional burden.
180. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. While the EPA removal program
addresses non-NPL sites as well as NPL sites, the vast majority of EPA attention and
resources are devoted to the remedial program, which focuses on NPL sites. For
example, in FY 1992, EPA obligated $145,000,000 for removal actions compared to
$569,000,000 for remedial actions. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CERCLIS
DATA BASE (June 21, 1993).
181. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (recommending that EPA
encourage a more active state role in the federal Superfund program).
182. For a description of one state's Superfund program, see Markell & Tuohy, supra
note 42; see also Markell, supra note 42, at 3.
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Quo Model"). s3 This Section discusses the possibility of a more
radical shift in federal/state relations, highlighting three alternative
frameworks for the federal/state relationship in the federal Superfund
program.
A. Alternative One: "The Delegation Model"
The Delegation Model contains elements one and three from the
Status Quo Model but differs from the Status Quo Model with respect to
element two. The federal Superfund program would continue to focus
on a relatively small subset of the total number of sites that need cleanup
action, and states would continue to bear the major responsibility for
non-federal sites. The Delegation Model would alter element two,
creating the expectation that EPA would delegate authority to the states
to address federal sites in addition to non-federal sites."' Under this
model, the federal role in administering cleanups even at federal NPL
sites would become much more limited.
Adopting and implementing this option effectively would
transform the Superfund program into a "delegated" program along the
183. The 90-Day Study concluded that "[tihe basic structure of the Superfund program
is sound and should be retained." 90-DAY STUDY, supra note 30, at 1-14. The authors
of the Study and then Administrator Reilly believed that making "major structural
changes" to the Superfund program would be "disruptive, counterproductive, and
unnecessary." Id. OTA also seems to favor a more gradual integration of states rather
than a radical transfer of responsibilities from EPA to the states in the near future.
COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 62.
184. See supra Sectiom II. Section II also recommends that the federal government
actively solicit and encourage a greater level of state involvement in the federal
Superfund program. The difference between the proposals for change in Section II and
Alternative One is that with the former, the expectation is to maintain the federal
government's Superfund infrastructure while more efficiently and completely integrating
states into the program. Alternative One represents a more radical restructuring in that
presumably, as states are delegated authority, the federal government would dismantle
significant components of its own infrastructure. Depending on implementation, the
two models in fact could produce a similar shift in responsibilities from EPA to the
states. The issue arises as to how completely Alternative One could be implemented.
Almost 10 years after the enactment of the 1984 amendments to RCRA, only 15 states
have delegated authority to implement these amendments. For a discussion of the
problem of the inability of more than a relatively small number of states to gain
delegation, see infra note 193.
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lines of the Clean Water Act" 5 and RCRA. s6 Several commentators
support such a radical shift.8 7
Officials assert general reasons for making such a radical shift.
First, as one interviewee stated, "You should define the problem first and
185. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see id. § 1342(b) (giving EPA
authority to delegate the permit program).
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see id § 6991c (giving EPA
authority to delegate the Underground Storage Tank program). Under these programs,
delegated states become the primary government actor. EPA becomes an overseer.
Under the Clean Water Act, for. example, delegated states issue permits, and EPA
reviews the permits. EPA has the authority and responsibility to veto inadequate
permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 123.44 (1992); Save the Bay, Inc.
v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1285-87 (5th Cir. 1977). If EPA concludes that the state is
implementing the entire program inadequately, EPA may withdraw the program. Id
at 1285.
In the enforcement context, states also play the primary role. OFFICE OF
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
REVISED POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS 1 (Aug.
1986). While EPA maintains that it retains complete, unfettered enforcement authority
in delegated states, see A. JAMES BARNES, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON RCRA OVERFILING I (May 1986), courts have
not uniformly accepted this position. See, e.g., United States v. ITr-Rayonier, Inc., 627
F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del.
1981).
187. Cf RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 117. Rivlin, approaching the issue from a different
perspective than most of the interviewees. He supports delegating most environmental
programs to states. She states that Washington, D.C., lacks the managerial capacity to
address these problems while also performing its most important and unique functions.
These functions include balancing the federal budget and reducing the federal deficit,
which Rivlin believes are critical to the nation's long-term economic health, and
managing international responsibilities. She suggests that "[i]t would be better to divide
the job, focus the energies of the federal government on the parts of the task for which
it has a distinct advantage, and rely on the states for activities they are more likely to
carry out successfully." Id.
Rivlin recommends that existing federal programs should be devolved to the
states or should gradually wither away, and believes that this devolution would help
reduce future pressure on the federal deficit. Id. at 119. She notes that important areas
exist in which cooperative federalism is necessary and desirable. One significant area
is environmental protection, especially because "[m]any hazards to the environment
cross state lines and cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by states and localities acting
alone." Id Based upon her philosophy toward federalism, Rivlin likely would support
delegating authority for the Superfund program to the states, at least in theory, because
hazardous waste sites generally are a local concern and do not cause interstate pollution
problems.
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then establish a structure that is designed to address the problem." Here,
the "problem" is 30,000-plus sites. Dividing these sites into different
categories and maintaining redundant bureaucracies at the federal and
state levels makes no sense. The size of the problem shows that the
federal government cannot handle the federal sites alone. Therefore,
states should have authority to address federal sites. Another interviewee
endorsed delegation by indicating that with regard to the Underground
Storage Tank ("UST") program"85 delegation became the obvious
option "as soon as people knew there were 100,000 tanks." He opined
that it was pre-ordained that the size of the UST universe would become
so large that the federal government could not handle the problem. He
urged that a similar situation exists in the CERCLA context.'89
Second, many of the considerations involving the appropriate
remediation of these sites focus on future land use. Officials ask
questions about issues such as (1) whether government should write off
the site so that no one can use it and (2) whether the government should
188. 42 U.S.C.S. § 6991-6991i (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
189. See Env't Rep. (BNA) 2901 (Dec. 25, 1992) (summarizing the magnitude of the
UST program and citing a report that concluded that the cost of removing underground
storage tanks and cleaning up soil and ground water they have contaminated could cost
more than $41 billion and "take more than 30 years to complete"). Projections for the
Superfund program in terms of total cost and time frame are similar. See supra note
36. On this point, several federal officials complained about the failure at the national
level to acknowledge publicly the true scope of the hazardous waste sites problem.
One official said that "we need to establish the universe of need." She added that the
construction grants program conducted "need surveys" to learn what the municipalities
needed to establish or upgrade their water treatment plants, but that no similar "universe
6f need" has been established under CERCLA.
The Congressional approach in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"), 33
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. 11 1990), is in stark contrast to the approach Congress
adopted for the UST program, despite the fact that OPA's regulatory universe similarly
is enormous. In OPA, Congress did not allow states to take the lead role in responding
to oil spills or in reviewing the many thousands of "response plans" that OPA requires
oil storage facilities, pipelines and vessels to submit. One EPA official estimated that
several hundred thousand such facilities, pipelines and vessels exist, and he noted that
the federal government, which Congress mandated to review these plans, lacks the
resources to do a comprehensive, timely review. For example, the United States
Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety, which is responsible under
OPA for reviewing several thousand pipeline response plans, has a total of six people
for all pipeline office compliance work. Telephone Interview with Stephen Luftig,
Acting Deputy Director, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency (July 7, 1993).
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clean up the site so that it is available for commercial or residential use.
Historically, land use is a matter primarily of local concern. Land use
decisions in the CERCLA context should also be local.
Third, delegation leverages resources by utilizing state resources
in addition to federal resources. Delegation also should increase the
number of "innovation centers" -- places where people think creatively -
- and thereby increases the likelihood of generating good ideas.
190
Fourth, a related concern is that EPA is overloaded with too much
work. EPA should delegate cleanup to the states that have the capability
to handle the cleanup program.
Fifth, delegation of the program would produce greater
community acceptance. The program will have greater credibility if
citizens believe their own people, not faceless federal bureaucrats, are
making the decisions.
Sixth, within a particular state, one set of rules would exist and
one agency would be accountable. Finally, if oversight is limited,
delegation would reduce duplication of effort."'
Several reasons exist for opposing the delegation option and
retaining a substantial federal role. First, the federal Superfund program
is finally producing results. EPA is moving sites through the system.
Demobilization of the federal infrastructure, therefore, does not make
sense now that the federal system is making progress.
Second, more than enough work exists for both governments.
The de facto division of responsibility that has evolved in many states
has produced a reasonable accommodation of the various governments'
interests.
Third, delegation is premature at this time. CERCLA is still a
young program, having only operated for the past few years. 92 Major
190. Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (finding that states may operate as "laboratories of social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country").
191. Most of these reasons for adopting a "delegation" approach also support making
the changes suggested in Section II.
192. Because of problems during the early years of the program, and due to the failure
to reauthorize CERCLA promptly in 1985, causing a virtual one-year halt to Superfund
work, many government officials suggest that the program has gotten on track qnly in
the past few years. As the OTA concludes, delay in Congressional reauthorization in
federal FY 86 had a "significant disruptive impact on Superflnd implementation."
COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 9 n.2. OTA also concludes that as of 1989, "after
nearly a decade, Superfund is still in its experimental stages." Id at 27.
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issues remain unresolved. In fact, many issues still come to EPA
Headquarters for decision. As one interviewee stated, "program contours
should be better delimited" before delegation occurs.
Fourth, adopting a structure that contemplates delegation is
premature because, according to several EPA and state officials,
relatively few states would want or could handle full delegation.' 93 In
fact, one state official from a major state said that he thought that unless
a large infusion of federal funds came with delegation, "a state would
have to be crazy to accept delegation" given states' extensive non-NPL
responsibilities. Another state official, also from one of the major states,
similarly stated that he did not think his state would want delegation
because he anticipated considerable EPA oversight given the large
193. EPA reports that at some sites where states have taken the lead role in Fund-
financed RIIFSs, quality problems and delays have arisen because some states do not
have successful cleanup programs. 90-DAY STUDY, supra note 30, at 3-25, 3-26. EPA
has noted that "[tihe prospects for increasing State involvement at both NPL and non-
NPL sites depend on the willingness and capacity of States to develop effective
programs, and obtain adequate State resources to fund cleanups, pursue enforcement to
obtain private cleanups, and conduct oversight activities." 50-STATE STUDY, 1991
UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1. OTA has concluded that "State participation in current
Superfund implementation ... has not been especially successful," COMING CLEAN,
supra note 38, at 62, and that "few States have effective cleanup programs." Id. at 13.
OTA has found that "[s]ome of the most important aspects of Superfund are missing
in other cleanup programs; for example, in other cleanup efforts there typically is no
preference for permanent cleanups, less opportunity for effective public participation
in the entire cleanup process, less attention to all significant risks to both health and
environment, and less public accountability." Id. at 13; see also id. at 64-65.
For a summary of GAO's, OTA's and EPA's concerns regarding states taking
responsibility for Superfund sites, see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text; see
also Government Operations Hearing, supra note 42, at 9 (prepared statement of
Richard L. Hembra, Director of GAO's Environmental Protection Issues, Resources,
Community, and Economic Development Division) ("The ability of most states to
handle the cleanup of larger, more complex sites is unproven. Most states have limited
hazardous waste cleanup experience and several have small programs"). GAO indicates
that the well-established states which GAO covered recognized that "cleaning up all of
the present sites ... will take ... more resources than are now available in their states."
STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 20. In the states that GAO covered with
"evolving" programs,, the "states generally recognize that the size of their hazardous
waste site problem is much greater than their present programs can handle." Id Based
on the GAO survey and the interviews the author conducted, many states have neither
the interest nor the capability to take responsibility for a significant number of NPL
sites. On the other hand, a limited number of states appear to have both the requisite
interest and capability.
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amount of money involved. 94
Fifth, many people criticized the program for the current
inconsistency among the ten regions.'95 The level of inconsistency will
increase dramatically if the program is delegated. Some interviewees
pointed to the UST program as an example of this inconsistency,
contending that under the UST program each state in reality selects its
own cleanup standards with little involvement from EPA, creating
rampant inconsistency. One interviewee said that "it is hard to envision
delegating the program without changing its nature. Among other things,
we would need to standardize remedies." 96
One downside resulting from a structure that institutionalizes
inconsistency is that large companies with facilities throughout the
United States would need to follow different procedures and meet
different requirements to address similar problems, leading to
inefficiencies and confusion. On the other hand, some interviewees
rejected the idea that inconsistency is necessarily bad, arguing instead
that each state should have the autonomy to make its own cleanup
decisions. These interviewees emphasized that the state, its citizens and
industry are those groups which will be most immediately affected by
such decisions. 97
194. Another state official from one of the ten states with more than 100 employees
devoted to waste activities said that although overall she favored delegation, she did not
"think that delegation is likely in [her state] because they don't want the Superfund
'taint."' She continued that "the relationship (between EPA and the state] is about as
good as it ever has been ... [and that t]his improvement is because of a sense of
partnership." She said she is "almost fearful of losing that partnership if Superfund was
delegated to the states." Other state officials disagreed with this assessment.
195. See, e.g., COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at Box I-C. OTA notes that a "major
cause of unnecessarily high or avoidable costs for prolonged negotiations and litigation
is the excessive flexibility inherent in the current program." Id "[T]he high level of
autonomy given to EPA .Regions, coupled with ineffective central management
oversight and control by EPA headquarters mean that cleanup decisions are often
vulnerable to challenge because they are inconsistent with EPA policies or statutory
requirements." Id.
196. GAO similarly urged against allowing deferral without requiring states to comply
with the NCP, including its remedy selection requirements, as a condition for such
deferral. STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 67.
197. See supra text following note 189. This issue is a fundamental policy question.
A primary concern that GAO and OTA expressed with increased state involvement is
a risk of inconsistent, and in some cases less protective, remedies. As EPA's Bruce
Diamond suggested, see supra note 41, the issue of the state role is "interwoven" with
other aspects of the program, such as the issue of "How clean is clean?"
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Sixth, interviewees offered three related criticisms: (1) The
amount of money involved in Superfund would "distort the process"
because states would want the program even if they were not capable; (2)
EPA would-be under "irresistible pressure" to approve states even though
most states could not handle the program; and (3) EPA never takes back
programs once it delegates them."'9
Seventh, EPA should have the responsibility if EPA will receive
the blame. The interviewee who offered this point said that Lee Thomas
told Congress several years ago: Either let me run the program, or give
it to the states.
Finally, one official said that with delegated programs,
competence typically emerges over time, but added that this competence
emerges only if a substantial increase in funding occurs. This official
noted that the issue of unfunded mandates to the states has become a
major concern'" and that providing states with significant additional
funding to meet program mandates may prove impossible and thereby
sabotage a delegated program approach."2 Additional funding
198. One federal official stressed the need for a middle level sanction, between
"reprimanding letters and countless meetings" and withdrawal of the program, if a
delegation model is adopted. She also suggested creation of a "Superfund federal
reserve fund" that would be available, together with expedited hiring authority, if EPA
needed to withdraw a program.
An example of EPA's inability to penalize states that are unable to meet
environmental requirements is currently being played out in the capacity assurance plan
("CAP") process. The CAP process involves states' obligations to submit CAPs,
specifying how the state intends to meet its capacity needs for hazardous waste disposal
for the next 20 years. See CERCLA § 105(8), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8) (1988). A state
loses federal Superfund dollars if a state fails to plan adequate capacity to meet its
projected hazardous waste disposal needs. Id EPA is responsible for reviewing these
CAPs and making the eligibility determination in terms of Superfund dollars. l
Despite a failure by several states to develop or submit CAPs that realistically will
provide adequate disposal capacity, EPA has failed to impose the statutorily-mandated
sanction. This issue is currently being litigated. See New York v. Reilly, 143 F.R.D.
487 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
199. See also RIVLIN, supra note 2, at 107-09. Rivlin notes that "state and local
officials [have become] increasingly strident in criticizing federal mandates." Id at
108.
200. See supra note 113. The federal government needs to resolve other issues in
addition to deciding (1) the criteria the federal government should use to determine
which states are "capable" of being delegated, (2) the type of oversight the federal
government should exercise, and (3) the types of federal authorities delegated states
should be able to use. See supra note 116 (discussing these issues).
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First, the government must confront the issue of dealing with transition if a
delegation approach is adopted. Many interviewees stated their view that relatively few
states currently are capable of or interested in delegation. This anecdotal evidence
appears to have support in the GAO, OTA and EPA studies of state capability. See
supra text accompanying note 193; see also supra Section II.A. Consequently, if the
government adopts a "delegation" model pursuant to which states are expected to
handle sites from start to finish, realistically, relatively few states could be expected to
receive delegation within the next few years.
Another sentiment that several officials strongly urged is that the federal
program has finally turned the comer and is working. They recommended that any
delegation, therefore, provide for a transition that would minimize the disruption in the
existing program and avoid undermining its recent successes.
Related to the idea of a transition is the concept of a "phased in" or
"segmented" delegation. See supra Sections II.B-D. This concept delegates the
functions, not entire sites, or provides for states taking responsibility for a limited
number of sites, with the specific sites delegated based on particular criteria.
Second, a need exists to ensure that a move to a delegated program, if such a
program includes access to the federal Superfund, benefits from the lessons learned in
the UST and construction grants programs. Both of these programs also involve federal
grants. Some interviewees said that UST seems to be working well. Others indicated
that UST "has let go of national consistency. Each state sets its own standards" One
state interviewee said that the UST and Superfund programs create an "anomaly." He
said that if a gas station is next to a Superfund site, the government will treat the plume
from the site much more than it will treat the gasoline plume, even if the latter is worse
from an environmental or health standpoint. His explanation was that "UST is a high
volume operation and states have flexibility not to clean up as much. If Superfund
standards were applied [to UST situations], we would spend lots more money." See
supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (suggesting that EPA should consider
whether to standardize remedies to a greater extent as a part of any delegation). The
explanation also relates to the point that the federal/state relationship issue is
inextricably linked to the resolution of substantive issues such as "How clean is clean?"
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
Third, in addition to oversight, the federal government should perform other
functions. Widespread agreement seemed to exist among the interviewees that EPA
could and should play a valuable role in certain areas: promoting the development of
cleanup technologies, developing consistent cleanup standards, serving as a
clearinghouse for information on cleanup technologies and supporting the development
of capable state programs. One interviewee expressed a view echoed by others when
he said that EPA "needs to put a lot more focus on R & D." One suggestion in this
regard was that EPA expand the use of personnel transfers under the Intergovernmental
Personnel Act so that EPA personnel could work in state offices to help states establish
sound programs and to nip problems in the bud. Government Operations Hearing,
supra note 42, at 202. The Core program cooperative agreement funding arrangement
is an existing mechanism for helping to build state Superfund capacity. One option is
to expand this program.
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problems could be alleviated to a certain extent, however, if EPA
reallocated the current level of funding of state programs from support
functions to state infrastructure development and to sites where states
have the lead.
The results of GAO's state survey reflect the interviewees' views that states
believe that EPA assistance could be most helpful in the areas of setting cleanup levels
and selecting remedies, including "more assistance with health effects data, reports on
new treatment techniques, training for state personnel on treatment technologies, and
training on choosing remedies." STATE CLEANUP STATUS, supra note 42, at 54. See
also Paula A. Sinozich, Project: The Role of Preemption in Administrative Law, 45
ADMIN. L. REV. 107, 211 (Spring 1993) ("From an efficiency perspective, the federal
government is better equipped than the states to undertake some necessary aspects of
hazardous waste control. For instance, economies of scale exist with respect to research
and development of technologies for controlling and reducing hazardous waste").
Fourth, the government must decide what type of delegation would be
appropriate. Options include (a) authorization, the approach followed in the Clean
Water Act, in which a state adopts adequate state authority to implement the program
and then administers the program under state law, or (b) delegation, the approach
followed to some extent in the Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 6992
(1988) (giving a state authority to implement federal law directly). Fhuly, fie
government must determine what process it should establish for delegation. One state
official suggested a "self-certification" process, in which the state would self-certify that
it is capable of administering the program. A second option, urged by several federal
officials, is to use a rulemaking process similar to that used in the Clean Water Act.
In this process, the state applies for authority to implement the program based on
specified criteria, providing a comprehensive description of its program and a
certification by the state's Attorney General that the state has adequate legal authority
to implement the program. The state then provides an opportunity for public comment
on the merits of this delegation/authorization. One citizen representative strongly
endorsed the latter approach. A federal official also endorsed this approach, arguing
that "with the amount of money involved, authorizations deserve heightened scrutiny."
Several interviewees agreed that RCRA was "how not to do it." They said that
after nine years, a total of 15 states had received delegation, and all parties suffered
from the burdens of delegation.
The decision on "process," including the related issue of who has the burden
of proof in determining whether a state should be authorized to implement various
aspects of the federal Superflnd program, will play a key role in the ultimate shape of
the program and the tates' ultimate role. Cf Belsky, supra note 3, at 61-62 (prior to
the Reagan administration, a federal program was not delegated unless a state had the
capability to meet the federal standards, but the Reagan administration shifted the
process and the burden of proof in favor of delegation, believing that a program should
be delegated unless the state is clearly shown to lack the authority or ability to carry
out its responsibilities).
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B. Alternative Two. "The Clean Break Model"
The "Clean Break Model" contains elements one and three from
the first two models. This model differs with respect to element two in
that the states' role in handling federal NPL sites would be eliminated or,
at a minimum, greatly circumscribed. Currently, even though the federal
government normally takes the lead at most federal sites, CERCLA
guarantees states the right to play a "substantial and meaningful"
role.2"' CERCLA also imposes significant responsibilities on states,
such as the obligation to provide part of the funding when sites need to
be cleaned up with government monies.202  Under this model, states'
rights and responsibilities would be limited significantly.2"3
C. Alternative Three: "The Comprehensive List Model"
The "Comprehensive List Model" eliminates the concept of two
lists of sites. One interviewee called the NPL an "artificial construct,"
adding that "[the sites] are all contaminated and need work."2°4  One
federal interviewee said that the analysis of the hazardous site problem
should contain three steps: (1) defining the problem; (2) defining
success, in terms of how many studies or how many cleanups; and (3)
formulating a federal/state approach that will create the highest
probability of success. He said that his sense is that the NPL will remain
at a "pre-ordained size" due to funding and budgetary issues. He found
that the benefit is that the program will ultimately "get out from under
the idea of failure" as it focuses on a limited universe of sites and moves
201. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
202. See generally CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988); see also supra notes
154-62 and accompanying text.
203. Those interviewees who discussed the issue agreed that politically, the Clean
Break Model would never survive.
204. OTA similarly concluded that EPA "has subordinated the environmental mission
of the [Superfund] program ... by, for example, limiting the number of sites placed on
the National Priorities List." COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 10. OTA also
concluded that "[t]he cutoff score of 28.50 has no technical basis. It is an arbitrary
number ... ." Id at 116. The OTA report noted that "[tihe number [28.50] was selected
in 1982 to come as close as possible to the 'at least 400 sites' required by CERCLA
for the first list." ld; .see also Government Operations Hearing, supra note 42, at 144
(testimony of Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn). OTA identified one option of putting all sites
on the NPL instead of a "massive deferral" of sites to other programs. COMING CLEAN,
supra note 38, at 11.
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them through the process. He criticized this approach by saying that the
NPL is not an "honest reflection of the size of the problem."' 20 5  He
elaborated that we should measure success by the time it takes EPA to
deal with the problem, beginning from the moment EPA receives a call
that a problem exists. He noted that the current "steady state" model is
destined to fail if this is the primary measure of success.
Under the Comprehensive List Model, instead of this artificial
construct, the federal and state governments, working together with their
existing resources, 2' 6 would develop a comprehensive inventory of sites
needing attention, prioritize these sites, and divide them so that the
federal government would be responsible for some cleanups and state
governments would be responsible for the others.20 7
A modified version of the Comprehensive List Model involves
eliminating the NPL and dismantling the bulk of the federal Superfund
infrastructure. Resources from this infrastructure, such as the 3500 plus
205. As OTA has noted, years of research and analysis of Hazard Ranking System has
found that it cannot reliably make fine distinctions from site to site: "[T~he current cut
off score of 28.50 for placement on the NPL ... was set on non-environmental grounds."
COMING CLEAN, supra note 38, at 63. As OTA points out, the "use of a single score
for the entire history of an NPL site doesn't mean much technically or environmentally.
The score is determined when information on the site is at its early and worst stage; the
score is never changed on the basis of new and improved information, such as the
eventual risk assessment, nor is it changed to reflect the environmental consequences
of emergency, removal, or remedial cleanup actions at the site." Id
206. One recent estimate is that EPA has approximately 3530 person-years working
on Superfund matters, and that the 50 states collectively have invested roughly 3650
person-years in remediating hazardous waste sites. ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PROGRAM EVALUATION BUDGET ANALYSIS FUNDING
RECOMMENDATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL BUDGET PRIORITIES PROJECT CENTER FOR
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 87 (May 1993); 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE, supra note
5, at 5.
207. Several interviewees offered their view that the NPL does not represent, a
prioritization of sites. Some interviewees fear that the NPL does not necessarily
contain the worst sites, nor does it prioritize adequately the sites on the List.
New York State's Department of Environmental Conservation has recently
refined its system for ranking sites. The system considers environmental, natural
resources, and public health concerns in assigning cleanup priority. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVTL. CONSERVATION, NEW YORK STATE, HWR-92-4047, DMvsION OF TECHNICAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM: PRIORITY RANKING SYSTEM FOR
CLASS 2 INACTIVE HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (Apr. 1, 1993). Such a system would
be a good starting point for a federal effort to prioritize sites.
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people working on Superfund matters, would be shifted to the states.203
The states would have primary responsibility for the nation's effort to
investigate and cleanup the comprehensive list of sites, with some level
of oversight from EPA.
IV. CONCLUSION
The discussion concerning the appropriate roles for the federal
and state governments in the battle to clean up the nation's toxic waste
sites is a chapter in the debate concerning how best to manage our
federal system; a debate that has been ongoing since our government was
created more than two hundred years ago.
CERCLA reauthorization provides a forum for refining or
radically restructuring the current framework for the federal/state
relationship in the Superfund arena. This Article concludes that the
federal government, at a minimum, should refine the existing framework
by taking several specific actions to strengthen the federal/state
relationship. Within the current framework, the federal government
should make several changes to improve the handling of NPL sites.
First, the federal government should maximize the contribution of
"capable" states in addressing Superfund sites, by allowing, and in fact
encouraging, states that are capable of and interested in handling entire
sites to do so. Second, the federal government should improve the
collective efficiency of the state and federal governments by eliminating
financial incentives for conflict between the two levels of government.
Third, the federal government should act to further improve the collective
efficiency of the state and federal governments by significantly
streamlining the Superfund process. EPA should not be obligated to be
"substantially involved" at sites where states take the lead, and states
should be rewarded financially and otherwise under the federal program
for successfully handling sites on their own. The federal government
also should streamline its internal procedures for handling sites. Finally,
the federal government should "go back to first principles" in terms of
communicating with the EPA regions and with the states. The federal
government needs to revisit both the message itself as well as the
208. See supra note 206 (regarding the number of federal Superfund employees). The
interviewees recognized that many federal employees might not transfer over to state
employment. Instead, the level of resources that the federal government had invested
in its Superfund effort would transfer.
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medium it uses to communicate this message. In addition, within the
existing framework, the federal government has the opportunity to
change Superfund to improve the completion of timely and effective
cleanups at non-NPL sites.
The federal government has the option to fundamentally alter the
framework for federal/state relations in the Superfund arena. The
Delegation Model, discussed in Section III, undoubtedly will receive
considerable attention and support during the upcoming reauthorization
debate, given its use in other programs and its intuitive appeal. This
appeal is due to its clear division of functions and its ability to allow the
federal government to focus on matters that truly are of national and
international importance and that only it can handle. Based on the
findings of this Article, Congress should be aware of two significant
issues associated with adopting such a model: (1) The impressive strides
the federal government appears to have made in recent years in
developing an infrastructure that has completed a large number of site
cleanups and achieved a significant number of PRP-funded studies and
cleanups, means that dismantling such an infrastructure clearly carries
risks, especially during the "transition" period; and (2) the uncertainty
concerning state "capability" to take over the Superfund program raises
questions as to whether a delegation model would create unrealistic
expectations that would lead to frustration and conflict. Congress'
careful consideration of both the "partial fixes" to the federal/state
relationship described above, as well as to the pros and cons of a more
radical shift of responsibilities, will contribute to producing a more
efficient and more effective federal/state partnership in the effort to clean
up the nation's thousands of toxic waste sites.
